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ABSTRACT

Free Trade Agreements and Purchasing Power Parity: Evidence from South
Korea
We explore whether a decline in tariffs after the passage of South Korea’s free trade
agreements yields evidence more favorable to purchasing power parity between South
Korea and its free trade partners. Our data include two aggregated measures of prices – the
CPI and the PPI – as well as disaggregated CPI data for six selected, highly tradable items:
food, alcoholic beverages, non-alcoholic beverages, clothing, footwear and tobacco
products. We study nine free trade partners using data for the sample period January 1998November 2017. Utilizing a battery of conventional linear unit root tests, we find limited
support for PPP between South Korea and its FTA partners after the free trade agreement.
Our results suggest that, even after the removal of tariffs, other barriers to trade may exist
that impede the free flow of goods and the attainment of purchasing power parity. It is also
possible that alternative tests that incorporate non-linearities may explain our results.
Free Trade Agreements and Market Integration: Evidence from South Korea
We consider the effects of free trade agreements on market integration between
South Korea and its FTA partners. Free trade agreements should reduce tariffs and trade
costs and lead to faster home-to-foreign price convergence. We investigate these ideas with
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a non-linear self-exciting threshold autoregressive (TAR) model, by introducing a
threshold break at the effective FTA date. This strategy allows us to consider: (1) whether
trade costs have declined after the free trade agreement; and (2) whether the speed of
adjustment in the home-foreign price differential is faster after the FTA. Our study covers
nine of fifteen South Korea's free trade agreements. We find evidence that after free trade
agreements, trade costs have been reduced for several countries, providing evidence that
greater market integration has been achieved on this score. However, evidence on whether
the speed of home-to-foreign price convergence increases after free trade agreements is
limited.
Does Inflation Targeting matter for Inflation Persistence?
Inflation targeting is a practice that central banks around the world began to adopt
as early as 1990. Inflation targeting policy was expected to lead to success on three counts:
(1) a decline in the level of inflation, (2) a reduction in the volatility of inflation, and (3) a
decline in inflation persistence, as a central bank publicly announced its commitment to a
target range for inflation. However, studies are divided over whether the three outcomes
have been realized. Studies of inflation targeting to date have generally relied on variations
of linear, autoregressive models. However, there are no studies of inflation targeting to
our knowledge that examine inflation persistence by using a model that allows for threshold
non-linearity at the targeted inflation range. In this paper, we adapt a threshold
autoregressive (TAR) model to study inflation persistence using a select sample of inflation
targeters. We compare estimates of inflation persistence from a TAR model over the
inflation targeting sample to estimates of persistence from a linear autoregressive model
for the period prior to the adoption of inflation targeting. We further examine differences
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in inflation persistence across level of development and for countries that have ever
experienced hyperinflation. To address issues raised that events unrelated to inflation
targeting policy could explain our findings, we include a select set of eight non-IT targeters
in our study and conduct a counterfactual exercise.
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CHAPTER 1 FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND PURCHASING POWER
PARITY: EVIDENCE FROM SOUTH KOREA
1.1 Introduction
The Law of One Price (LOP) states the price of an identical good between two
countries should be equalized, once the prices are converted into the same currency. If we
expand this to the basket of goods and services, it would be Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).
Even though LOP or PPP are building blocks of international economics and finance, there
is limited supportive evidence for LOP or PPP in the real world. For example, the price of
iPad air (16 GB, Wi-Fi ) varies across countries; the price of iPad air (16GB, Wi-Fi) in
Argentina in 2013 is US $1,094, but its price in Malaysia in 2013 is US $473 1 . According
to “Buy Low and Sell High”, the price of a good should be equalized across countries;
however, there is limited supportive evidence of LOP or PPP in the real world; i.e., the
question remains, how could an identical good have different prices across countries?
Many studies have centered research on the question: why LOP or PPP does not
hold in the real world? There are several factors which may influence LOP or PPP;
however, Sarno and Taylor (2002) with other studies (e.g., Rogoff, 1996; Taylor and
Taylor, 2004) argue trade barriers, such as tariffs and non-tariffs, and trade costs play a
dominant role affecting price differentials of identical goods across countries. That is, trade
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Source: National Master (http://www.nationmaster.com)
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barriers and trade costs create a wedge between the price of an identical good across
countries.
Since the 1900’s, many countries in the world have endeavored to decline or
eliminate trade barriers among nearby countries by using Free Trade Agreements (FTA).
FTA is one of the trade policies that may eliminate or decrease trade barriers, particularly
tariffs. The fact that trade barriers across countries are declining means the markets are
integrated. By promoting FTA among neighboring countries, many countries in the world
are trying to achieve market integration among member countries. South Korea is not an
exception in this endeavor.
As of January 2018, South Korea has fifteen effective FTAs with fifty-two
countries. FTA between South Korea and its FTA partners would decrease trade barriers
between them by eliminating or decreasing tariffs, and a decline in trade barriers may
increase trade volumes between South Korea and its FTA partners. Because of economies
of scope and scale due to increase in trade volumes after FTA, all trade costs such as
transportation costs or distribution costs would decline (Hummels and Skiba, 2002; 2009).
This may suggest FTA has a positive effect on PPP between South Korea and its FTA
partners. In this study, we explore whether FTA matters for PPP between South Korea and
its FTA partners.
There are some studies on the effects of FTA on PPP; Blavy et al. (2009) and Dutt
et al. (2014) focus on the effects of NAFTA on PPP, and Engel et al. (1996) and Moodley
et al. (2000) focus on whether CUSTA would help PPP hold between Canada and the U.S.
However, they find limited evidence of positive effect of FTA on PPP. The reason why
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Dutt et al. (2014), Engel et al. (1996) and Moodley et al. (2000) do not find supportive
evidence of PPP among Canada, the U.S. and Mexico after FTA may be because relative
to other countries, these countries already had lower trade barriers, and also they were
major trade partners with each other before CUSTA or NAFTA. Possibly, Canada, the U.S.
and Mexico may not be good examples to explore the positive effects of FTA on PPP.
Our study is distinctive in three ways. One distinction concerns the sample
countries that had relatively high trade barriers and were not major trade partners for preFTA unlike the sample countries investigated in previous studies (e.g., Blavy et al., 2009;
Dutt et al., 2014; Engel et al., 1996; Moodley et al., 2000). In other words, South Korea
and its FTA partners had relatively high trade barriers for pre-FTA, and most were not
South Korea’s major trade partners. If FTA matters for PPP, the countries in our sample
may help to identify stronger supportive evidence of PPP for post-FTA. The second
distinction is that this study would be possibly the first Korean study to the best of our
knowledge to assess the effects of FTA from the perspective of market integration.
Although market integration among member countries is the objective of FTA, there are
few South Korean studies on the effects of FTA on market integration2 . Many studies test
whether LOP or PPP holds to find the evidence of market integration among countries 3.
Our study may answer whether market integration has been achieved between South Korea
and its FTA partners. Finally, we investigate whether there is supportive evidence of PPP
after FTA with various types of unit root tests as well as both aggregate price indices (i.e.,

There is literature available on South Korea’s FTA where the focus is on the negative
effects of FTA on South Korea’s economy, e.g., the negative effects of FTA on agricultural
industries, and how to resolve these issues.
3
See Chinn (1997), Cheung et al. (2003) and Moosa and Bhatti. (1997).
2

3

CPI and PPI) and disaggregate price indices. It may give a more robust explanation on the
effects of FTA on PPP for overall economy and the selected individual goods markets.
Our findings show limited supportive evidence for the positive FTA impact on PPP
between South Korea and its FTA partners, and the results are heterogeneous across unit
root tests and price indices: Both aggregate CPI and PPI support the positive impacts of
FTA on PPP only for Peru, but not for other countries. For disaggregate level of CPI, we
find positive effects of FTA on PPP only for the U.S.; however, the results are different by
goods and unit root tests. ADF unit root test with the null of non-stationarity support the
positive effects of FTA on PPP only for footwear while KPSS unit root test with the null
of stationarity supports the positive impacts of FTA on PPP for food, non-alcoholic
beverage, alcoholic beverage and footwear. Our findings may suggest that the objective of
FTA, market integration, is not achieved between South Korea and its FTA partners.
Although after FTA, tariffs on around seventy percentage of imports between South
Korea and its FTA partners were eliminated or reduced, and also trade volumes increased,
there is limited supportive evidence of PPP between South Korea and its FTA partners.
This suggests that a decline in tariffs may not matter for PPP, and factors other than a
decline in tariffs4 exert a stronger influence on PPP; e.g., a decrease in volatility of nominal
exchange rates may have a more significant impact on PPP 5 .
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The other examples for the alternative explanations could be heterogeneous qualities of
goods across countries, different export demand elasticity by country and local currency
pricing, etc.
5
Engel et al. (2001)'s finding may support this as Engel et al. (2001) discover a decline in
the volatility of nominal exchange rates support more PPP than a decline in trade barriers.
4

This study is organized as follows: the effects of FTA on Korean economy are
shown in section 1.2, and we introduce purchasing power parity and previous studies on
the effects of FTA on PPP in section 1.3. We describe data and empirical models in section
1.4. Also, we present the empirical results in section 1.5 and then we explore factors that
may affect LOP or PPP in section 1.6. Finally, we conclude this study in section 1.7.

1.2 South Korea’s FTAs and Its Effects
As of January, in 2018, South Korea has signed fifteen Free Trade Agreements
including the latest Columbia FTA (July 2016) with fifty-two countries (Table 1.1) after
FTA between South Korea and Chile was in effect in 2004. The objective of FTA is market
integration among member countries, eliminating trade barriers among them.
For free trade agreements with trade blocs-EFTA, ASEAN and EU-, there are at
least four countries involved. We select one country having the highest trade volume with
South Korea: Norway from KOR-EFTA FTA, Indonesia from KOR-ASEAN FTA and
Germany from KOR-EU FTA. With effective fifteen FTAs, South Korea has been
negotiating FTAs with other countries such as Korea-China-Japan FTA and South Korea Israel FTA.
Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 display tariffs for about seventy percent of the imports
eliminated during the first year of FTA. The decrease and elimination of tariffs may
increase trade openness. Table 1.4 displays trade openness increasing since FTA for most
FTA partners. Alba et al. (2007) and Wu et al. (2011) find that trade openness has positive
influences on PPP across countries. That may be because trade cost per unit of a good

5

would be decreased as an increase in trade volume may cause economies of scope and
scales (see Hummel and Skiba, 2002; 2009).
Some studies (e.g. Alba et al., 2005; Cho et al., 2014; Lothian et al., 2002) find that
PPP would be more likely to hold when real exchange rate is less volatile between two
countries6. Accordingly, we investigate whether real exchange rate volatility is less volatile
after FTA. Table 1.5 displays other countries than Norway show the real exchange rate
volatility has decreased after FTA. This may suggest PPP between South Korea and other
FTA partners than Norway might be more likely to hold after FTA.

1.3 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and Previous Studies
1.3.1 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
PPP dictates the nominal exchange rate between two countries, domestic country
and foreign country, should be equal to the ratio of price levels between the two countries,
which is referred to as absolute PPP. The equation is as follows:

𝑆𝑡 =

𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡∗

(1.1)

where, 𝑆𝑡 : nominal exchange rate, 𝑃𝑡 : domestic price level, 𝑃𝑡∗ : foreign price level

6

Since Mussa (1986) argues that the volatility of real exchange rate is lower under fixed
exchange rate regimes than under floating exchange rate regimes, many studies look at
how the volatility of real exchange rates influence PPP and find there is more supportive
evidence of PPP under a fixed exchange rate regime. Previous studies, thus, suggest that
when the volatility of real exchange rate is lower, there is more supportive evidence of
PPP.
6

Since aggregate price indices such as CPI or PPI are used as price levels when
testing whether PPP holds, if price indices of two countries have different composition of
goods and services of basket, equation (1.1) might not hold. To allow for different baskets
of price indices between two countries, Cassel (1918) argues PPP presents the percentage
change in exchange rate between two countries is the same as the difference of the
percentage change in two countries’ price level (inflation rate), known as relative PPP. We
can represent this, taking natural logarithm of each side of equation (1.1), as follows:
𝑠𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡∗

(1.2)

where, 𝑠𝑡 : the natural logarithm of the nominal exchange rate, 𝑝𝑡 : the natural
logarithm of domestic price level, 𝑝𝑡∗ : the natural logarithm of foreign price level
Some previous studies (e.g. Frenkel, 1976) test relative PPP, utilizing the following
equation (1.3):
𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑝𝑡∗ + 𝜖𝑡

(1.3)

where, 𝑠𝑡 : the natural logarithm of the nominal exchange rate, 𝑝𝑡 : the natural
logarithm of domestic price level, 𝑝𝑡∗ : the natural logarithm of foreign price level, 𝜖𝑡 : white
noise
They test whether the coefficients of the equation (1.3) are satisfied with both
symmetry (𝛽1 = −𝛽2) and proportionality (𝛽1 = −𝛽2 = 1) to see whether PPP holds. They
do not, however, consider whether all three variables are stationary before carrying out
regression analysis. If the variables are not stationary, they might cause spurious regression.
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During the 1980s, other researchers (e.g. Adler et al., 1983; Darby, 1983; Edison, 1987;
Meese et al., 1988) derived real exchange rate from equation (1.2) as follows:
𝑟𝑡 = 𝑠𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡∗ + 𝜖𝑡

(1.4)

where, 𝑟𝑡 : the natural logarithm of the real exchange rate, 𝑝𝑡 : the natural logarithm
of domestic price level, 𝑝𝑡∗ : the natural logarithm of foreign price level
They test for evidence of PPP through an examination of the time-series properties
of real exchange rate as follows:
𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡

(1.5)

where, 𝑟𝑡 : the natural logarithm of the real exchange rate, 𝜖𝑡 : white noise
According to the LOP or PPP theory, if PPP holds, the real exchange rate should
settle down at zero over time; meaning, the price differential of identical goods would be
zero over time. In other words, the real exchange rate would be mean-reverting toward zero
as shown in Figure 1.1.
However, empirically, aggregate price indices are used to test for PPP, and thus real
exchange rate would settle down at any constant level. In order that PPP holds, meanreversion is a necessary condition. Many researchers examine whether a real exchange rate
contains a unit root (𝜌 =1) to see whether PPP is supportive. If |𝜌| = 17, Real exchange rate
follows random walk., the real exchange rate contains a unit root, which means that the
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Real exchange rate follows random walk.
8

real exchange rate does not revert toward its mean, so PPP is not supportive. If | 𝜌 | <1, it
means the real exchange rate reverts towards its mean, which means PPP is supportive.
If FTA helps PPP hold, real exchange rate between South Korea and its FTA
partners would be less persistent and mean-revert toward its mean quickly after FTA as
shown in Figure 1.2.

1.3.2 Previous studies on the Effects of FTA on PPP
There are many factors affecting PPP8. However, Sarno et al. (2004) argue trade
barriers and trade costs may play a dominant role on PPP holds. Some studies (e.g. Dumas,
1992; Sercu et al., 1995; Taylor et al., 2004; Zussman, 2002) find that trade barriers such
as tariffs and non-tariffs affect price differentials among countries; i.e., when trade barriers
among countries decline, there may be more supportive evidence of PPP. Obstfeld et al.
(1997) and Zussman (2002) find a positive relationship between price differentials and
trade barriers among 32 countries, and 101 countries, respectively. Therefore, we may
expect more supportive evidence of PPP among member countries when Free Trade
Agreements are in effect. However, most empirical studies find limited evidence for the
positive impacts of FTA on PPP.
Engel et al. (1996) and Moodley et al. (2000) investigate whether PPP holds
between Canada and the U.S. after CUSTA. Engel et al. (1996) do not find positive effects
of FTA on a decline in price differential between the U.S. and Canada after CUSTA,
instead they discover larger price differentials between them. However, Moodley et al.

8

trade openness, growth rate, inflation and distance, different productivity levels, language
barriers among countries etc.
9

(2000) find supportive evidence of PPP both pre- and post- CUSTA. Since it is not clear
whether the supportive evidence of PPP for post-CUSTA results from CUSTA or not, they
cannot argue the positive effects of CUSTA on PPP between the U.S. and Canada.
Blavy et al. (2009) and Dutt et al. (2014) explore whether NAFTA has positive
influences on PPP among Canada, Mexico and the U.S. Blavy et al. (2009) utilize
Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) Model with both aggregate CPI and disaggregate CPIs.
They find the speed of mean-reversion of real exchange rate is faster for post-NAFTA for
all three countries. However, the speed of mean-reversion of real exchange rate between
the U.S. and Canada is relatively faster than the speed of mean-reversion of real exchange
rate between the U.S. and Mexico, and between Canada and Mexico. Also, they discover
the speeds of mean-reversion of real exchange rate are different across commodities and
countries. Dutt et al. (2014) use Pedroni Panel Cointegration test with CPI; however, they
do not find supportive evidence of PPP after NAFTA among Canada, Mexico and the U.S.
Lee (2010) finds supportive evidence of PPP among seven Multilateral Free Trade
Agreements (e.g., ASEANFTA, CISFTA, EEA etc.) using Pedroni Panel Unit root test.
However, she explores whether there is supportive evidence of PPP only for post-FTA. As
Lee (2010) does not compare supportive evidence of PPP among the countries between
pre-and post-FTA, her findings may not argue clearly whether supportive evidence of PPP
is from FTA or something else. In addition, since she uses panel unit root test, she could
not tell which two countries or how many countries among member countries hold PPP.
Wei et al. (1995) investigate whether countries in two free trade areas - the European
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) hold PPP;
however, they do not find supportive evidence of PPP among them.
10

1.4 Empirical Model and Data
1.4.1 Empirical Model
For PPP, a real exchange rate should be stationary. When this happens, the real
exchange rate converges on a constant level, called mean - reverting. We explore whether
a real exchange rate is mean - reverting, using a battery of unit root tests. There are various
unit root test methodologies. In general, there are two types of unit root tests: singular unit
root tests (e.g., Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin
(KPSS)) and panel unit root tests (e.g., Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC), Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS)).
As one of singular unit root tests, ADF unit root test is specifically utilized to test
PPP, and its null hypothesis is that a real exchange rate has a unit root. However, because
of low test power of ADF unit root test, if there are not enough long-term period real
exchange rate data, it cannot detect the stationarity of real exchange rate. Accordingly,
many researchers (e.g., Abuaf et al. 1990; Flood et al. 1996; O'Connell 1998; Papell 1997)
suggest panel unit root tests because they could raise the test power by increasing the
information used in the test. Since Abuaf et al. (1990) showed panel unit root tests support
PPP in the short run, many researchers (e.g., Flood et al. 1996; Frankel et al. 1996;
O'Connell 1998; Papell 1997) have used a panel unit root test to increase the test power.
There are several types of panel unit root tests; however, Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) panel unit
root test and Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) panel unit root test are used most often to test PPP.
LLC panel unit root test does not allow different 𝜌 across panels; however, IPS panel unit
root test does, and thus we use IPS panel unit root test in this study. A concern with the IPS
panel unit root test is that its null hypothesis is joint non-mean reversion of all real exchange
rates across panels used in the test. The null hypothesis could be violated even if only one
11

of the real exchange rate data has mean-reversion; thus, basically cannot identify how many
countries or which country’s real exchange rate has mean-reversion.
Due to the limitation of conventional standard unit root tests (e.g., ADF unit root
test), Elliot et al. (1996) propose a unit root test with generalized least square detrending
of the data to improve test power. This is referred to as the Dickey-Fuller Generalized Least
Squares (DF-GLS) unit root test. DF-GLS unit root test has higher test power than ADF
unit root test. We can perform DF-GLS unit root test by an individual country; thus,
resolving the uninformative issue with panel unit root test.
There is another type of unit root test called Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin
(KPSS) unit root test that Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) suggest. Unlike the null of ADF, DFGLS and IPS panel unit root test (𝐻0 = 𝐼(1)), the null of KPSS unit root test is a real
exchange rate does not have unit root (𝐻0 = 𝐼(0)). Utilizing various unit root tests with
two opposite null hypotheses, we may have more robust evidence regarding PPP holds
after FTA9.

1.4.1.1 Im-Pesaran-Shin Panel Unit Root Test
Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) panel unit root test specification is represented by equation
(1.6):
𝑝−1

(1.6)

𝛥𝑟𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗 𝑟𝑗,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖 ∆𝑟𝑗,𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜖𝑗,𝑡
𝑖=1

9

Henricsson et al. (1995) argue that we can see the stationarity of a time series data,
strongly by comparing the results between ADF unit root test (I(1)) and KPSS unit root
test (I(0)) with apposite null hypothesis, which is called “𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑠”. Choi
(2004) also uses the two- unit root tests with these two different nulls.
12

The subscript 𝑗 indexes South Korea's FTA partners, 𝜖𝑗,𝑡 is independently
distributed normal for 𝑗 and 𝑡 , and 𝜖𝑗,𝑡 has heterogeneous variances across panels. 𝑝
indicates lag, and we follow Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to determine the lag.
Also, 𝛼𝑗 are heterogeneous intercepts across panels. The null is 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = ⋯ = 𝛽𝑛 = 0. If
it is rejected, it says that at least one country in the panel holds PPP.

1.4.1.2 Singular Unit Root Tests
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
unit root test follows the equation (1.7) below:
𝑝−1

𝛥𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑟𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜗𝑖 ∆𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜖𝑡

(1.7)

𝑖=1

Here 𝑟𝑡 is real exchange rate, the variance of 𝜖𝑡 is 𝜎 2 , and it follows 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑝 is the
number of lags. Its null is 𝛽 = 0. If it is rejected, there is supportive evidence of PPP.
Dickey-Fuller Generalized Least Squares (DF-GLS) Unit Root Test In order to resolve
the low test power of ADF unit root test, we also use the Dickey-Fuller Generalized Least
Square (DF-GLS) with better test power that Elliott et al. (1996) suggest. The specification
of DF-GLS is as follows:

𝑝−1

∆𝑞𝑡∗

∗

=𝛼 +

∗
𝛽 ∗ 𝑞𝑡−1

∗
+ ∑ 𝜗𝑖∗ ∆𝑞𝑡−𝑖
+ 𝜖𝑡∗
𝑖=1
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(1.8)

Here 𝑞𝑡∗ is GLS demeaned real exchange rate (𝑟𝑡 )10 , the variance of 𝜖𝑡∗ is 𝜎 ∗ 2 , and it
follows 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑝 is the number of lags. Its null is 𝛽 ∗ = 0. If it is rejected, it means that there
is supportive evidence of PPP.
When the lag length is too small, ADF test suffers from low test power (See Hall,
1994; Ng et al., 1995), but the DF-GLS test suffers from size distortion (See Ng et al.,
2001). Offering a better combination of size and power, we use “general - to - specific”
rule to determine lags for ADF test, following Hall (1994) and Ng et al. (1995), and the
Modified Akaike Information Criterion (MAIC), following Ng et al. (2001) for DF-GLS
unit root test.
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) Unit Root Test Kwiatkowski-PhillipsSchmidt-Shin (KPSS) unit root test analyzes whether a time series variable does not contain
a unit root, testing the null of stationarity. KPSS unit root test assumes we can decompose
the series into the sum of a deterministic trend, a random walk, and a stationary error as
follows:
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜉𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

(1.9)

𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡

(1.10)

Where 𝑟𝑡 is a random walk

Where 𝑢𝑡 follows 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. (0, 𝜎𝑢2 )
The initial value 𝑟0 is treated as fixed and serves as an intercept. Real exchange
rate does not have time trend under PPP, so 𝜉 is zero. Since 𝜀𝑡 is a stationary error, the

10

Please see Appendix A for more detail.
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null hypothesis is that 𝑦𝑡 is stationary when 𝜎𝑢2 = 0. Accordingly, the null hypothesis for
the KPSS is 𝜎𝑢2 = 011. If its null is rejected, PPP is not supportive.

1.4.2 Data
To construct real exchange rates between South Korea and its FTA partners, we
utilize consumer price index (CPI, 2015=100), and producer price index (PPI, 2015=100)
as price level. For exchange rate of FTA partners against South Korea, we use average
period nominal exchange rate against U.S. dollar and calculate cross rate with this. We use
International Financial Statistics (http://data.imf.org) and Organization For Economic CoOperation and Development (OECD) statistics (http://stats.oecd.org/) to obtain aggregate
price indices and average nominal exchange rate against U.S. dollar. We use disaggregate
CPI (2015=100) classified by the classification of individual consumption by purpose
(COICOP). We have the data from each FTA partner's Department of Statistics or
comparable agency website12.We select the most highly tradable goods: Food, Footwear,
Clothing, Alcoholic Beverages, Non-alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. However, there is
limited availability of disaggregate consumer price index across countries13, and thus we
̂ = 𝑇 −2 ∑𝑇𝑖=1 𝑆𝑡2 /𝑆 2 (𝑙) where 𝑆𝑡2 is the partial
The KPSS test statistic is as follows: 𝐿𝑀
sum of deviations of residuals from the sample mean, 𝑆 2 (𝑙) is a consistent estimator of the
long run variance (𝜎 2 ) of the regression error, 𝑙 is a lag truncation parameter. To avoid size
problem, we need to choose lag and kernel. We use “automatic bandwidth” for the lag, and
“Quadratic Spectral Kernel” for the kernel. Andrews (1991) and Newey et al. (1994) argue
that “Quadratic Spectral Kernel” yields more accurate estimates of long run variance (𝜎 2 )
than other kernels, e.g., the Bartlett kernel employed by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). In
addition, Hobijn et al. (2004) find that the combination of the automatic bandwidth
selection option and the quadratic spectral kernel yields the best test performance from
Monte Carlo Simulations. See Andrews (1991), Hobijn et al. (2004) and Newey et al.
(1994) for detail.
12
Please see Appendix B for more information.
13
Singapore does not provide separate disaggregate CPI not only for Clothing and
Footwear, but also for Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. Therefore, we use Singapore's
11
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investigate the effects of FTA on PPP with disaggregate CPI only for the selected six items
for five FTA partners: Germany, Norway, Singapore, Turkey and the U.S. We use monthly
data over the sample periods from January, 1998 to November, 201714.

1.5 Empirical Results
Although IPS panel unit root test cannot identify which FTA partner that PPP may
hold with South Korea, it may be useful to perform IPS panel unit root test since IPS panel
unit root test has higher test power than standard singular unit root tests, particularly ADF
test. We perform this test to study whether FTA has positive influences on PPP regardless
of countries and goods. After IPS panel unit root test, we use all three singular unit root
tests for both pre-and post- FTA to find which FTA partner or which good market that FTA
has positive impacts on PPP for.

1.5.1 Aggregate Price Indices
1.5.1.1 IPS Panel Unit Root Test Results
Table 1.6 displays the IPS panel unit root test results from aggregate CPI and PPI.
Both CPI and PPI support PPP for pre-FTA while only PPI supports PPP for post- FTA.
Although PPI supports PPP for post-FTA, we cannot determine whether the supportive

disaggregate CPI for Food, Clothing and Footwear, Non-Alcoholic Beverages, Alcoholic
Beverages and Tobacco. Also, Chile only provides disaggregate data from January, 2009;
thus, we cannot use this to analyze the effects of FTA on PPP since KOR-Chile FTA is in
effect in April, 2004
14
Since Germany used Euro after 1999, We use data for Germany from 1999.
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evidence of PPP results from FTA since PPP between South Korea and its FTA partners is
supported for both pre- and post- FTA.

1.5.1.2 Singular Unit Root Test Results
For the unit root tests with the null of non-stationarity - ADF and DF-GLS unit root
test, ADF test has low test power; thus DF-GLS unit root test can be used to test whether
PPP holds when ADF test does not find supportive evidence of PPP since it has higher test
power than ADF unit root test. For this reason, we apply the ADF unit root test, first, and
then the DF-GLS unit root test for countries with no supportive evidence for PPP from
ADF unit root test. As Choi (2004) and Henricsson et al. (1995) did, we also use KPSS
unit root test to see whether the stationarity of real exchange rate is robust.
Table 1.7 shows all three-singular unit root test results from aggregate CPI. For preFTA, ADF test supports PPP for Indonesia, KPSS test supports PPP for Norway; however,
countries other than these two countries do not display supportive evidence of PPP
regardless of unit root tests. For post-FTA, we find supportive evidence of PPP for Peru
from DF-GLS unit root test; however, all three-unit root tests do not support PPP for other
FTA partners.
Table 1.8 displays the stationarity of real exchange rates from all three singular unit
root tests from aggregate PPI. For pre-FTA, ADF unit root test supports PPP for Singapore,
but not for the other countries. KPSS unit root test supports PPP for the U.S. For post- FTA,
ADF unit root test does not support PPP for all FTA partners; however, supportive evidence
of PPP for Peru and the U.S. is found from DF-GLS and KPSS unit root test, respectively.
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Through various unit root tests, panel or singular unit root test, and unit root test
with the two opposite nulls- non-stationarity versus stationarity, we find limited evidence
for the positive FTA impacts on PPP as shown in Table 1.6 - Table 1.8.

1.5.2 Disaggregate Price Indices
The reason we do not find supportive evidence of PPP in Section 1.5.1 may center
around our use of aggregate price indices. As some studies argue, aggregate price indices
include non-tradable goods; potentially affecting PPP not holding. Therefore, we analyze
whether FTA has positive influences on PPP, using disaggregate CPI for six highly tradable
goods: food, alcoholic beverage, non-alcoholic beverage, clothing, tobacco and footwear.

1.5.2.1 IPS panel unit root test
For IPS panel unit root test with disaggregate CPI, the panel of each county includes
all six highly tradable goods. Unlike our expectation, we find more supportive evidence of
PPP for pre-FTA than post-FTA (Table 1.9). Although we find supportive evidence of PPP
for Turkey and the U.S. for post- FTA, it is difficult to argue the positive effects of FTA
on PPP for them as we also find supportive evidence of PPP for pre-FTA.

1.5.2.2 Singular unit root tests
Table 1.10 - Table 1.14 delineate ADF, DF-GLS and KPSS unit root test results
across goods and countries. We also find limited evidence on the positive impacts of FTA
on PPP from disaggregate CPI.
For pre-FTA, ADF unit root test supports PPP for alcoholic beverage and tobacco
for Singapore, and for food and alcoholic beverage for Norway. KPSS unit root test
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supports PPP for footwear for Turkey, for food, non-alcoholic beverage, clothing and
footwear for Germany, and for non-alcoholic beverage and alcoholic beverage for Norway.
For post- FTA, there is limited supportive evidence of PPP for most six goods
across countries. Our findings display supportive evidence of PPP for the U.S., but not for
other FTA partners. KPSS unit root test supports PPP for food, non-alcoholic beverage,
alcoholic beverage and footwear for the U.S. PPP for only footwear for the U.S. is strongly
supported by both two different types of unit root tests- ADF and KPSS unit root test.

1.6 Why does PPP not hold between South Korea and its FTA partners for
post-FTA?
Despite a decrease or elimination of tariffs and an increase in trade volume after
FTA, there is limited supportive evidence of PPP for post-FTA between South Korea and
its FTA partners. Our findings imply other factors than a decrease in tariffs may matter for
PPP. There are five possible explanations for why there is limited supportive evidence of
PPP between South Korea and its FTA partners after FTA.
First, even after FTA, there are still non-tariffs between South Korea and its FTA
partners such as rules of origin, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) rules, antidumping and
so on. These may exert a stronger effect on PPP than a decline or an elimination of tariffs.
Second, the volatility of nominal exchange rate may play a stronger role in
determining whether PPP holds than trade barriers. Table 1.15 delineates the change in
volatility of nominal exchange rate after FTA. The volatility of nominal exchange rate for
some countries such as Singapore, India and Norway, significantly, has increased after
FTA. Engel et al. (2001) discover the volatility of nominal exchange rate has more effects
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on PPP than trade barriers. Their findings may provide some explanation for our findings
of a lack of supportive evidence of PPP for post-FTA for Singapore, India and Norway.
Third, heterogeneous productivity levels between South Korea and its FTA partners
may support our findings. According to Balassa and Samuelson effects (see Balassa (1964)
and Samuelson (1964)), the different productivity levels across countries may result in no
supportive evidence of PPP. As shown in Table 1.16, there is a large difference in
productivity level between South Korea and its FTA partners. Even though FTA allows for
free movement of goods between countries, labor does not move freely, resulting in labor
market segmentation, which may cause a lack of support for PPP.
Fourth, exporters charge different prices across countries because export demand
elasticity for most products, and local costs, such as distribution costs or local taxes, vary
by country. This is called “Pricing to Market ”. Different local costs and demand elasticity
for a good that South Korea exporters or its FTA partners might face can affect the rejection
of LOP or PPP.
Fifth, model misspecification used in this study may be another explanation for our
findings. Many studies do not consider trade costs when they test LOP or PPP; however,
some studies (e.g., Dumas, 1992; Obstfeld et al., 1997; Sercu et al., 1995 ) argue that trade
costs should be considered when PPP or LOP is tested because LOP or PPP is based on
arbitrage. Non-linearity of price differential may arise depending on whether trade costs
are larger or smaller than price differentials. We may need to incorporate non-linearity of
price differential in testing PPP. For this, it may be better to employ non-linear models (e.g.
Threshold Autoregressive models). All unit root tests used in this study cannot detect the
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non-linearity of price differential behavior, which may cause limited supportive evidence
of PPP after FTA between South Korea and its FTA partners.

1.7 Conclusion
Although LOP or PPP is a building block of international economics and finance
theories, there is limited supportive evidence of LOP or PPP. In this study, we explore
whether a decline in tariffs matters for PPP from evidence of South Korea’s FTA. When
FTA is in effect among member countries, tariffs among them would be eliminated or
reduced. It may result in a decline in trade barriers and an increase in trade volumes among
them; thus, more supportive evidence of PPP may be expected between South Korea and
its FTA partners for post-FTA.
Although the tariffs on almost seventy percentage of imports for both South Korea
and its FTA partners have been eliminated or decreased at the FTA effective year, and trade
volumes among them have increased after FTA, we find limited evidence for the positive
impacts of FTA on PPP between them. Our findings imply factors other than a decline in
tariffs; i.e., the volatility of nominal exchange rates, non-tariffs, heterogeneous
productivity across countries may exert stronger roles in PPP.
By testing whether PPP holds between South Korea and its FTA partners after FTA,
we expect to answer whether FTA has enhanced market integration between South Korea
and its FTA partners. However, the presence of other factors affecting PPP may limit our
ability to see market integration between South Korea and its FTA partners by testing PPP.
Accordingly, our findings demonstrate that testing PPP may not be a good way to
see the evidence for market integration; thus, we suggest an alternative way to see whether
21

FTA has enhanced market integration between South Korea and its FTA partners.
Generally, we may say that market integration across countries would be achieved when
trade barriers have declined among them. A decline in trade barriers may causes increase
in trade volumes, so trade costs would be lowered when countries are integrated. We may
explore whether trade costs have declined after FTA to see whether FTA has enhanced
market integration between South Korea and its FTA partners. We leave this for future
study.
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Table 1.1 South Korea’s FTA partners and FTA Effective Dates

FTAs by country

Countries

Effective
Date

Countries

Effective
Date

Countries

Effective
Date

Chile

2004.04.01

Singapore

2006.03.02

India

2010.01.01

Peru

2011.08.01

U.S.

2012.03.15

Turkey

2013.05.01

Australia

2014.12.12

Canada

2015.01.01

China

2015.12.20

New Zealand

2015.12.20

Vietnam

2015.12.20 Colombia 2016.07.15

FTAs by trade blocs

Countries

Effective
Date

EFTA(4)

2006.09.01

Countries

Effective
Date

ASEAN(10) 2007.06.01

Source: South Korea Customs (http://www.customs.go.kr)
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Countries

Effective
Date

EU(28)

2011.07.01

Table 1.2

Tariff Elimination Schedules: FTAs by country
% of Imports that Tariffs

FTA

Countries

% of Imports that Tariffs
FTA

Countries

Eliminated (year 0)

South Korea

Eliminated (year 0)

87.2%

KOR-Chile

South Korea
KOR- India

8 years for zero tariffs
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Chile

41.8%

India

South Korea

59.7%

South Korea

85.54%

KOR- Singapore

KOR-Peru
Singapore

100%

Peru

67.86%

South Korea

80.0%

South Korea

80.0%

Turkey

65.0%

KOR-the U.S.

KOR- Turkey
U.S.

82.1%

South Korea

75.2%

KOR- Australia

South Korea

81.9%

KOR- Canada
Australia

90.9%

Canada

76.4%

South Korea

49.9%

South Korea

48.3%

KOR- China

KOR- New Zealand
20.1%

New Zealand

92.0%

South Korea

91.3%

South Korea

82.38%

Colombia

60.64%
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China

KOR- Vietnam

KOR-Colombia
Vietnam

86.3%

Source: South Korea Customs (http://www.customs.go.kr)

Table 1.3

Tariff Elimination Schedules: FTAs by trade blocs

FTA

Countries

% of Imports that Tariffs Eliminated (year 0)

South Korea

86.3%

EFTA

100%( excluding agricultural products)

South Korea

70%

ASEAN

Decrease in Tariffs on 50% of total imports
by 0-5%

South Korea

81.7%

EU

76.6%

KOR-EFTA

KOR-ASEAN

KOR-EU

Source: South Korea Customs (http://www.customs.go.kr)
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Table 1.4

Trade Openness: Pre-and Post-FTA

FTAs by country

FTA partners

Pre-FTA

Post-FTA

% Change

Chile

0.26

0.53

107.73

Singapore

1.41

2.12

49.87

India

0.77

1.39

80.73

Peru

0.10

0.22

128.58

U.S.

9.09

8.09

-11.03

Turkey

0.31

0.49

57.42

FTAs by trade blocs

FTA partners

Pre-FTA

Post-FTA

% Change

Norway (KOR⋅EFTAFTA)

0.17

0.41

141.18

Germany (KOR⋅EUFTA)

2.04

1.99

-2.51

27

1.37

Indonesia (KOR⋅ASEAN FTA)

1.79

30.66

Note 1. Trade openness is calculated by dividing trade volumes (exports + imports)
by South Korea nominal GDP and calculate their average for each period.
2. Data sources: South Korea Customs (http://www.customs.go.kr)
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Table 1.5

Change in Real Exchange Rate Volatility: Pre-and Post FTA

FTAs by country

FTA partners

Pre-FTA

Post-FTA

†F-test (p-value)

Chile

0.19

0.12

0.00

Singapore

0.20

0.11

0.00

India

0.11

0.05

0.00

Peru

0.15

0.06

0.00

U.S.

0.11

0.04

0.00

Turkey

0.18

0.09

0.00

FTAs by trade blocs
FTA partners

Pre-FTA

Post-FTA

†F-test (p-value)

Norway (KOR⋅EFTAFTA)

0.10

0.14

0.00

Germany (KOR⋅EUFTA)

0.11

0.08

0.00

Indonesia (KOR⋅ASEAN FTA)

0.13

0.11

0.01

𝐻0 : Average 𝑉𝑜𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝐹𝑇𝐴 = Average 𝑉𝑜𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐹𝑇𝐴
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Table 1.6

IPS Panel Unit Root Test Results from Aggregate Price Indices

Price Index

Pre-FTA

Post-FTA

CPI

-4.85 ***

-0.70

PPI

-3.60 ***

-1.60 **

Note: 1. All the figures represent 𝑊𝑡̅ statistics.
2. *** <0.01, ** <0.05
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Table 1.7 Singular Unit Root Test Results (CPI)

FTAs by country

H 0: I(1)

H 0: I(0)

ADF

Country

DF-GLS

KPSS

Post-FTA

Pre-FTA

Post- FTA

Pre- FTA

Post-FTA

Chile

-2.50(2)

-1.75 (1)

0.32 (2)

-1.17 (3)

1.69 (3) ***

0.99 (2) ***

Singapore

-2.33 (2)

-2.15 (2)

1.28 (1)

-0.32 (2)

2.04 (3) ***

1.63 (3) ***

India

-1.68 (8)

-1.63 (2)

-0.80 (2)

-1.85 (2)

0.57 (3) **

0.60 (3) **

Peru

-2.80 (2)

-1.50 (2)

-0.49 (2)

-2.06 (8) **

0.75 (3) ***

1.37 (3) ***

U.S.

-2.08(3)

-1.93(2)

-0.29 (3)

-1.88 (2)

1.80 (3) ***

0.56 (3) **
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Pre- FTA

Turkey

-1.10 (5)

-1.92 (1)

-1.20 (8)

0.28 (1)

3.30 (3) ***

1.78 (2) ***

FTAs by trade blocs
H 0: I(1)

H 0: I(0)

ADF

Country

DF-GLS

KPSS
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Pre- FTA

Post-FTA

Pre-FTA

Post- FTTA

Pre- FTA

Post-FTA

Germany

-1.93 (1)

-1.82 (1)

-1.72 (1)

-0.81 (1)

1.19 (3) ***

1.63 (3) ***

Norway

-2.79 (2)

-0.48 (2)

-0.21 (2)

-0.66 (2)

0.33 (3)

2.00 (3) ***

Indonesia

-3.34 (8) ***

-1.84 (1)

-

-0.96 (1)

0.87 (3) ***

0.75 (3) ***

Note: 1. p-value: ***<0.01, ** < 0.05
2. All the figures represent ADF, KPSS, DF-GLS statistics, respectively.
3. The number in the parenthesis displays “lag” chosen by Ng and Perron (1995) for ADF and by MAIC for DF-GLS,
by automatic bandwidth for KPSS.

Table 1.8

Singular Unit Root Test Results (PPI)

FTAs by country

H 0: I(1)

H 0: I(0)

ADF

Country

DF-GLS

KPSS

Post-FTA

Pre-FTA

Post- FTA

Pre- FTA

Post-FTA

Chile

N/A

-1.32 (9)

N/A

0.03 (9)

N/A

1.60 (3) ***

Singapore

-2.98 (5) **

-1.43 (1)

-

-0.83 (2)

0.62 (3) **

0.78 (3) ***

India

-2.71 (1)

-1.63 (2)

-1.11(1)

-1.01 (2)

0.61 (3) **

1.49 (3) ***

Peru

-2.75 (1)

-2.56 (1)

0.86 (2)

-2.23 (3) **

0.61 (3) **

1.00 (3) ***

U.S.

-2.54 (2)

-1.34 (7)

-0.97(2)

-1.13 (7)

0.38 (3)

0.39 (3)
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Pre- FTA

Turkey

-1.02 (5)

-2.01 (1)

-1.43 (5)

-0.34 (1)

3.49 (3) ***

1.52 (2) ***

FTAs by trade blocs
H 0: I(1)

H 0: I(0)

ADF

Country

DF-GLS

KPSS

Post-FTA

Pre-FTA

Post- FTA

Pre- FTA

Post-FTA

Germany

-1.48 (1)

-2.11 (1)

-1.81 (1)

-1.10 (2)

2.28 (3) ***

1.44 (3) ***

Norway

-0.14(8)

-1.39 (1)

-0.84 (8)

-0.46 (1)

1.45 (3) ***

0.78 (3) ***

Indonesia

-2.75 (2)

-2.50 (1)

0.39 (2)

0.29 (1)

1.62 (3) ***

0.84 (3) ***
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Pre- FTA

Note: 1. p-value: ***<0.01, ** < 0.05
2. All the figures represent ADF, KPSS, DF-GLS statistics, respectively.
3. The number in the parenthesis displays “lag” chosen by Ng and Perron (1995) for ADF and by MAIC for DF-GLS,
by automatic bandwidth for KPSS

Table 1.9

Im-Pesaran-Shin Panel Unit Root Test Results from disaggregate CPIs

FTA partners

Pre-FTA

Post-FTA

FTA partners

Pre-FTA

Post-FTA

Singapore

-3.76 ***

-1.23

Germany

0.70

-1.05

Turkey

-2.99 ***

-1.98 **

Norway

-4.91 ***

2.01

U.S.

-2.89 ***

-3.13 ***

Note: 1. All the figures represent 𝑊𝑡̅ statistics.
2. *** <0.01, ** <0.05
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Table 1.10

Singular Unit Root Test Results for Singapore
H 0: I(1)

Items

H 0: I(0)

ADF

DF-GLS

KPSS

Post-FTA

Pre-FTA

Post- FTA

Pre- FTA

Post-FTA

Food

-2.29 (2)

-2.23 (2)

1.44 (2)

-0.48 (2)

2.20 (3)***

0.73 (3)***

Non-Alcoholic Beverage

-2.34 (2)

-2.33 (1)

0.60 (1)

-0.86 (2)

1.44 (3)***

0.57 (3)***

Alcoholic Beverage and Tobacco

-3.24 (1)**

-1.39 (2)

-

-0.99 (1)

0.53 (3)**

0.90 (3)***

Clothing and Footwear

-1.37 (8)

-1.50 (2)

0.92 (9)

-1.05 (2)

1.92 (3)***

0.76 (3)***

36

Pre- FTA

Note: 1. p-value: ***<0.01, ** < 0.05
2. All the figures represent ADF, KPSS, DF-GLS statistics, respectively.
3. The number in the parenthesis displays “lag” chosen by Ng and Perron (1995) for ADF and by MAIC for DF-GLS,
by automatic bandwidth for KPSS.

Table 1.11

Singular Unit Root Test Results for Turkey
H 0: I(1)
ADF

Items

H 0: I(0)
DF-GLS

KPSS

37

Pre- FTA

Post-FTA

Pre-FTA

Post- FTA

Pre- FTA

Post-FTA

Food

-1.65 (1)

-0.25 (7)

-1.09 (1)

0.88 (2)

0.91 (3) ***

1.82 (2) ***

Non-Alcoholic Beverage

-1.55 (1)

-2.38 (1)

-1.44 (1)

-0.35 (1)

0.52 (3) **

1.42 (2) ***

Alcoholic Beverage

-0.44 (2)

-2.15 (1)

0.68 (1)

-0.60 (1)

2.32 (3) ***

0.84 (2) ***

Tobacco

-1.29 (2)

-1.50 (1)

0.90 (2)

-0.16 (1)

2.37 (3) ***

1.66 (2) ***

Clothing

-1.58 (8)

-0.95 (8)

-0.63 (9)

0.94 (7)

0.56 (3) **

1.57 (2) ***

Footwear

-2.29 (6)

-1.91 (6)

-1.42 (10)

0.15 (6)

0.39 (3)

1.62 (2) ***

Note: 1. p-value: ***<0.01, ** < 0.05 2. All the figures represent ADF, KPSS, DF-GLS statistics, respectively.
3. The number in the parenthesis displays “lag” chosen by Ng and Perron (1995) for ADF and by MAIC for DF-GLS,
by automatic bandwidth for KPSS.

Table 1.12

Singular Unit Root Test Results for the U.S.
H 0: I(1)

ADF

Items

H 0: I(0)

DF-GLS

KPSS

Post-FTA

Pre-FTA

Post- FTA

Pre- FTA

Post-FTA

Food

-2.40 (2)

-1.99 (2)

0.29 (2)

-1.67 (3)

2.57 (3) ***

0.36 (3)

Non-Alcoholic Beverage

-1.74 (2)

-2.41 (1)

0.18 (2)

-0.98 (3)

2.88 (3) ***

0.25 (3)

Alcoholic Beverage

-2.27 (3)

-2.46 (1)

-0.87 (3)

-1.25 (3)

0.45 (3) **

0.20 (3)

Tobacco

-1.24 (8)

-1.42 (1)

-1.07 (1)

-0.95 (1)

0.75 (3) ***

1.39 (3) ***

Clothing

-1.46 (6)

-1.61 (2)

0.57 (11)

-0.003 (3)

3.40 (3) ***

0.65 (3) **

Footwear

-2.40 (3)

-3.42 (1) **

0.38 (12)

-

3.12 (3) ***

0.13 (3)
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Pre- FTA

Note: 1. p-value: ***<0.01, ** < 0.05 2. All the figures represent ADF, KPSS, DF-GLS statistics, respectively.
3. The number in the parenthesis displays “lag” chosen by Ng and Perron (1995) for ADF and by MAIC for DF-GLS,
by automatic bandwidth for KPSS.

Table 1.13

Singular Unit Root Test Results for Germany
H 0: I(1)
ADF

Items

H 0: I(0)
DF-GLS

KPSS
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Pre- FTA

Post-FTA

Pre-FTA

Post- FTA

Pre- FTA

Post-FTA

Food

-2.45 (2)

-2.37 (1)

-0.87 (3)

-1.01 (2)

0.22 (3)

1.39 (3) ***

Non-Alcoholic Beverage

-2.24 (1)

-1.82 (1)

-1.47 (1)

-1.26 (1)

0.23 (3)

1.46 (3) ***

Alcoholic Beverage

-1.49 (1)

-1.24 (5)

-1.77 (1)

-0.56 (1)

1.94 (3) ***

1.75 (3) ***

Tobacco

-0.78 (2)

-1.20 (1)

-0.91 (2)

-0.68 (1)

2.39 (3) ***

1.57 (3) ***

Clothing

-2.46 (5)

-1.76 (6)

-1.53 (1)

-0.76 (6)

0.28 (3)

1.70 (3) ***

Footwear

-2.63 (3)

-1.92 (6)

-0.93 (2)

-0.99 (6)

0.30 (3)

1.52 (2) ***

Note: 1. p-value: ***<0.01, ** < 0.05 2. All the figures represent ADF, KPSS, DF-GLS statistics, respectively.
3. The number in the parenthesis displays “lag” chosen by Ng and Perron (1995) for ADF and by MAIC for DF-GLS,
by automatic bandwidth for KPSS.

Table 1.14

Singular Unit Root Test Results for Norway
H 0: I(1)

Items

H 0: I(0)

ADF

DF-GLS

KPSS

Post-FTA

Pre-FTA

Post- FTA

Pre- FTA

Post-FTA

Food

-2.94 (3) **

-0.01 (2)

-

-0.29 (2)

1.24 (3) ***

2.78 (3) ***

Non-Alcoholic Beverage

-1.82 (6)

-0.52 (5)

-1.56 (1)

-1.39 (12)

0.28 (3)

1.91 (3) ***

Alcoholic Beverage

-4.33 (1) **

-0.87 (1)

-

-0.72 (1)

0.32 (3)

1.13 (3) ***

Clothing

-1.82 (8)

-0.27 (6)

1.06 (12)

-0.54 (12)

2.16 (3) ***

3.22 (3) ***

Footwear

-2.26 (3)

-0.36 (6)

0.89 (12)

-0.53 (6)

2.06 (3) ***

2.67 (3) ***
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Pre- FTA

Note: 1. p-value: ***<0.01, ** < 0.05 2. All the figures represent ADF, KPSS, DF-GLS statistics, respectively.
3. The number in the parenthesis displays “lag” chosen by Ng and Perron (1995) for ADF and by MAIC for DF-GLS,
by automatic bandwidth for KPSS.

Table 1.15

Change in Nominal Exchange Rate Volatility: Pre-and Post-FTA

FTAs by country

FTA partners

Pre-FTA

Post-FTA

†F-test (p-value)

Chile

0.20

0.12

0.00

Singapore

0.09

0.13

0.00

India

0.12

0.15

0.03

Peru

0.15

0.09

0.00

U.S.

0.12

0.04

0.00

Turkey

0.60

0.19

0.00

FTAs by trade blocs
FTA partners

Pre-FTA

Post-FTA

†F-test (p-value)

Norway (KOR⋅EFTAFTA)

0.11

0.15

0.00

Germany (KOR⋅EUFTA)

0.15

0.08

0.00

Indonesia (KOR⋅ASEAN FTA)

0.15

0.17

0.41

† 𝐻0 : Average 𝑉𝑜𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝐹𝑇𝐴 = Average 𝑉𝑜𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐹𝑇𝐴

41

Table 1.16

Heterogeneous Productivity Level Between South Korea and Its FTA
Partners

GDP per capita relative
Country

GDP per capita relative
Country

to South Korea

to South Korea

South Korea

100

Turkey

67.27

Chile

62.44

U.S.

151.01

Singapore

229.69

Indonesia

31.47

India

18.27

Norway

179.19

Peru

33.75

Germany

127.41

Source: the world factbook (https://www.cia.gov)
Note: The figure is calculated by 2017 GDP per capita (PPP).

42

Figure 1.1 Mean-Reversion of Real Exchange Rate

Figure 1.2 Behavior of Real Exchange Rate (Pre-FTA vs Post-FTA)
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CHAPTER 2 FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND MARKET INTEGRATION:
EVIDENCE FROM SOUTH KOREA15
2.1 Introduction
Over the last thirty years, the pace of removal of barriers to international exchange
has increased, especially in developing and emerging market countries. For many countries
nowadays, protectionist trade policies have been supplanted with trade-liberalizing policies
as way to promote market integration and encourage economic growth. South Korea is a
case in point.
South Korea is a country that has a high dependency on foreign trade. Exports plus
imports are almost 70 percent of GDP revealing that international trade is crucial to the
South Korean economy. At present, South Korea has signed free trade agreements (FTAs)
with fifty-two countries. Whether or not these agreements have intensified market
integration in South Korea is an open question. Our paper fills this gap.
Numerous studies examine the degree of market integration by asking whether the
differential between home and foreign prices is persistent or tends to dissipate over time16.
A handful of studies focus on whether free trade agreements or other market integration

15

Lim, E.S. and J.B. Breuer. Submitted to Journal of International Money and Finance,
09/2017
16
Studies include Moosa et al. (1997); Chinn (1997); Goldberg et al. (1997); Krueger
(1997); Laureti (2001); Goldberg et al. (2005); Lee (2010); and Ogrokhina (2015).
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efforts have led to an increased pace of dissipation. Nearly all of these studies assess market
integration by testing if the Law of One Price, or its aggregated version Purchasing Power
Parity, holds, using unit root tests. Support for market integration is found if a unit root in
the home-foreign price differential can be rejected, implying that home and foreign prices
converge over time. Evidence from these studies is mixed.
We look at a more natural question about market integration: Have trade costs
associated with the arbitrage of goods declined after the passage of free trade agreements?
We study nine of fifteen South Korea's free trade agreements. Few studies examine the
impact of free trade agreements on market integration from this angle. Our paper adds to
this literature.
We use Heckscher (1916)'s commodity points model as a framework for examining
international arbitrage in goods with trade costs. The role of trade costs in arbitrage has
been a missing element in many studies of the Law of One Price and Purchasing Power
Parity17. In an arbitrage model, the identified threshold delineates the ‘trade' and ‘no trade'
zones and gives a measure of the size of trade costs.
While self-exciting TAR models have largely been used to study the behavior of
the home-foreign price differential inside and outside the ‘no trade' zone in making claims
about market integration, we instead use these models to study the size of trade costs.
Because we are interested in the effects of free trade agreements on trade costs, we
incorporate a novel feature into the TAR: a structural break in the threshold at a point in
time. In our paper, the time-break occurs at the free trade agreement date. To the best of

17

Exceptions include Davutyan et al. (1985), Obstfeld et al. (1997), Michael et al. (1997),
and Sarno et al. (2004).
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our knowledge, the strategy we propose for testing for whether there is a time-break in the
threshold has not been considered elsewhere. There is a long literature on discontinuous
TAR models and smoothed variants like the STAR, ESTAR, and LSTAR model which all
incorporate threshold effects. Some papers acknowledge that thresholds may change, yet,
none that we are aware of introduce and test for a time-break in the threshold. Jacks et al.
(2017) estimate different silver point thresholds over three periods in the early 1900s but
do not test for whether the thresholds are different. Cho et al. (2014) allow for different
thresholds based on a trade-intensity measure using an exponential smooth-transition
autogressive model to test purchasing power parity. Pavlidis et al. (2011) estimate an
ESTAR model that allows for time-varying trade costs, measured not by the threshold, but
rather by a variable constructed to capture trade costs. Blavy et al. (2009) allow for
differences in thresholds across commodity types between the United States and its two
NAFTA partners - Canada and Mexico.18 Canjels et al. (2004) allow for smooth trend
change in gold point thresholds.
The strategy for testing for a time-broken threshold that we offer has two basic
steps: (1) testing for a TAR model over the full sample period, as well as the sub-periods
demarcated by the FTA event, against a linear autoregressive model using the method of
Hansen (1997) and Hansen (2000). Because of the nuisance parameter problem that arises
with TAR models, a bootstrapped distribution of Wald test statistics must be generated for
evaluating the null hypothesis. Conditional on the findings in the first step, the second step
relies on a conventional Wald test: testing the full-sample unbroken TAR model against a

18

They also test whether a TAR model provides a better fit than an AR(p) model in both
the pre- and post-FTA subsamples. They, however, do not test whether allowing for a break
at the FTA date provides a better fit than an unbroken TAR model.
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time-broken threshold model constructed from joining the estimated piece-wise sub-period
models before and after the FTA. Because a threshold has been identified in the prior step,
the Wald test, in this case, is free of the nuisance parameter problem and bootstrapping a
distribution of Wald statistics is not required. Using this strategy yields a test for
differences in trade costs before and after free trade agreements between South Korea and
its trading partners. We also report whether the price gap erodes more quickly outside the
band of inaction after the free trade agreement.
Estimation of our model yields two findings. First, we find that the adoption of
FTAs has reduced trade costs between South Korea and several of the FTA partners we
study. The decline in trade costs differs by country, with some seeing a decline in trade
costs of 50 percent or more. This finding suggests that free trade agreements promote
market integration. Second, for those countries where FTAs have led to lower trade costs,
we report mixed and admittedly cursory evidence on whether the speed of mean reversion
in the home-foreign price differential has become faster outside the band of inaction after
the FTA. We caution the use of these latter findings on home-foreign price convergence to
impute evidence for or against market integration. We conclude that tests of whether
market integration intensifies after a free trade agreement are best studied with a focus on
the impact of whether FTAs lead to a decline in trade costs.
We have organized the remainder of the paper as follows: Section 2.2 discusses
market integration and South Korea's FTAs. Section 2.3 introduces a simple arbitrage
model of trade with and without costs and with and without the effect of a free trade
agreement. Section 2.4 describes the data, the estimation strategy, and the results. Section
2.5 concludes.
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2.2 South Korea's Free Trade Agreements
2.2.1 Market Integration
The main reason countries desire market integration is a belief that market
integration enhances prospects for sustained economic growth. Market integration is
expected to foster increased competition and specialization as countries engage in trade
with each other. Free trade agreements are expected to initiate a virtuous cycle of market
integration by first reducing or eliminating costs associated with tariffs and external
barriers to trade. Then, as these costs are eliminated, increased opportunities for
international trade will intensify competition and enlarge economies of scope and scale.
These market-driven changes are expected to exert downward pressure on the costs of
trade. Such costs may come in a variety of forms: transportation, insurance, paperwork,
dealing with language barriers, or costs associated with avoiding exchange rate volatility,
to name a few19. Market-driven changes are also expected to reduce the gap between crossborder differences in the prices of goods. Both of these changes further the process of
market integration, setting the stage for faster economic growth and even stronger market
integration20.
In order to harmonize markets across countries and reap the benefits of
specialization and competition, many countries have lowered trade barriers through signing
multilateral agreements such as GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and
WTO (World Trade Organization) Rounds. Both GATT and WTO Rounds have helped in

19

See O'Connell and Wei (2002) for further discussion.
There are many facets to market integration. Balassa (1961) and Wood (1979) provide a
history of thought on the meaning of “economic integration.”
20
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reducing trade barriers among countries, but they are not as efficient as bilateral and
regional trade agreements because the interests of many countries must be considered. As
a result, there has been a proliferation of regional free trade agreements worldwide. South
Korea is not alone in this endeavor.

2.2.2 Free Trade Agreements between South Korea and its FTA partners
South Korea has twelve bilateral FTAs and three multilateral FTAs covering fiftytwo countries21.Table 2.1 shows the two types of FTAs and the dates the FTAs became
effective22. South Korea's first FTA was with Chile in 2004 and the latest five FTAs – with
Canada, China, New Zealand, Vietnam, and Colombia – were all signed in 2015 or later.
There have been no new free trade agreements with trade blocs in force since 201123.
Tables 2.2 - Table 2.3 display the percentage of imports with tariffs that have been
eliminated for both South Korea and its free trade partners when the FTAs went into effect.
Although tariffs on all imports are not eliminated immediately, tariffs are eliminated on 70
percent of imports on average in the first year of the FTA.
As tariffs between South Korea and its FTA partners are reduced, it is anticipated
that trade volumes will rise. Appendix C reports the trade volumes - before and after the
FTA - for each free trade partner. In nearly all cases, the free trade partners had a very
small share of overall trade volume with South Korea at less than 1 percent of GDP. After

21

Singapore and Vietnam have both a bilateral FTA with Korea and they are also part of
ASEAN FTA partners.
22
The data source for Tables 2.1 -2.3 is http://www.customs.go.kr.
23
South Korea is currently negotiating bilateral FTAs with Israel and several multilateral
FTAs: South Korea-China-Japan FTA, and the Central American FTA with Costa Rica,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.
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the free trade agreements by country, South Korea's trade volumes with its FTA partner
countries increased over 60 percent. However, after FTA with trade blocs, the effect on
trade volumes was much more varied: trade volume with some partner countries rose over
50 percent while for other partner countries, there were declines.
Rising trade volumes, however, are not sufficient evidence that greater market
integration has been achieved. Cross-border trade flows may increase because of trend
exchange rate movements or rising incomes, unrelated to the free trade agreements.
Stronger support that greater market integration has occurred should be observed in a
reduction in the costs associated with trade and the gap between cross-border prices of
similar goods. We turn to this next.

2.2.3 An Arbitrage Model of Trade with Costs
We use Heckscher (1916)'s commodity points model of arbitrage to explore the
effects of free trade agreements on market integration. To lay the foundation, we first derive
the model assuming trade costs TC=0. We then incorporate trade costs and derive the band
of inaction. We assume two countries – the home country (South Korea) and the foreign
country (free trade partner) – engage in trade with each other. Further, we assume they can
each produce and sell all the same goods.
The condition establishing when the home country will export good j to the foreign
country at time t is given by:
∗
𝑝𝑗,𝑡 < 𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑗,𝑡
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(2.1)

and the condition establishing when the home country will import good j from the foreign
country is given by:
∗
𝑝𝑗,𝑡 > 𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑗,𝑡

(2.2)

∗
where 𝑝𝑗,𝑡 is the price of home good 𝑗 in home currency at time 𝑡 and 𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑗,𝑡
is the price of

foreign good 𝑗 expressed in the home country currency: 𝑠𝑡 is the exchange rate at time
∗
𝑡 expressed as home currency per unit of foreign currency and 𝑝𝑗,𝑡
is foreign currency price

of foreign good 𝑗.
Trade in good 𝑗 will occur until profitable arbitrage opportunities cease. This happens
when:
𝑝𝑗,𝑡
∗ =1
𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑗,𝑡

(2.3)

Thus, arbitrage will lead to convergence in home and foreign prices; that is, the
relative home-foreign price ratio will approach 1.0.
What happens when trade costs 𝑇𝐶 – expressed as a percentage of home or foreign
prices – are introduced? The condition for home country export is now:
∗
𝑝𝑗,𝑡 < 𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑗,𝑡
(1 + 𝑇𝐶)

(2.4)

and the condition for home country import is now:

∗
𝑝𝑗,𝑡 (1 + 𝑇𝐶) < 𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑗,𝑡

(2.5)

Combining the two inequalities defines the ‘band of inaction', where no trade occurs:
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𝑝𝑗,𝑡
1
<
∗ < (1 + 𝑇𝐶)
(1 + 𝑇𝐶) 𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑗,𝑡

(2.6)

1

Here, we have two thresholds, the lower (1+𝑇𝐶) and the upper (1 + 𝑇𝐶). These are the
“trade points.” These points are assumed to be symmetric in costs and time-invariant24.
In the inner regime defined by equation (2.6), arbitrage is not profitable for either
the home country or the foreign country because the costs associated with trade exceed the
𝑝

price differential. Hence, there will be no trade; 𝑠 𝑝𝑗,𝑡∗ is not expected to converge to 1.0.
𝑡 𝑗,𝑡

However, in the two “outer regimes” – above the upper threshold or below the lower
threshold – arbitrage takes place until the home-foreign price differential converges to
either the upper or lower threshold where trade ceases to be profitable25.
To provide clarity and consistency between the arbitrage model and the empirical
model below, we adapt the arbitrage model in several ways. First, we define the regime
∗
conditions in log terms where 𝑟𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑗,𝑡 ) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑗,𝑡
) – is the log of the home1

foreign price differential for tradable good 𝑗 – and 𝑐 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑇𝐶) and −𝑐 = log(1+𝑇𝐶)
Now, define 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 as deviations 𝑟𝑗,𝑡 from its mean. In the theoretical case, the mean of 𝑟𝑗,𝑡 is
zero and so 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑗,𝑡 .
In the inner regime, 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 satisfies:
−𝑐 < 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 < 𝑐

24

(2.7)

See Sercu et al. (1995) and Prakash et al. (1997).
Sercu et al. (1995) and O'Connell (1998) argue arbitrage will persist until the price
differential converges to the trade point thresholds.
25
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In the two outer regimes, 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 satisfies:
𝑞𝑗,𝑡 > 𝑐
{
𝑞𝑗,𝑡 < 𝑐

(2.8)

Heckscher (1916)'s model provides a proposition about the behavior of 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 - the
demeaned home-foreign price differential for good j - in the inner and outer regimes. In the
inner regime, 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 may behave as a random walk, i.e. contain a unit root, due to the absence
of arbitrage. In the outer regime where arbitrage pressures arise, 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 will move toward 𝑐
when it is above the upper edge of the band and toward −𝑐 when it is below the lower edge
of the band. Thus, 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 will revert toward the thresholds over time. Figure 2.1 illustrates.
Inside the band of inaction where there is no arbitrage 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 is a random walk; outside the
bands, 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 converges to |𝑐|.
We incorporate one additional feature into the arbitrage model with trade costs: an
assumption that the thresholds may change after the adoption of free trade agreements.
Thus, we introduce a break in the thresholds [𝑐, −𝑐] at period 𝜏. The introduction of a
threshold break into (2.7) and (2.8) can be expressed as:
−𝑐 𝜏 < 𝑞𝑗,𝑡 < 𝑐 𝜏

(2.9)

𝑞𝑗,𝑡 > 𝑐 𝜏
{

(2.10)
𝑞𝑗,𝑡 < 𝑐

𝜏

where 𝜏 = 𝑎, 𝑏. and 𝑎 = 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 FTA and 𝑏 = 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 FTA.
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In theory, free trade agreements will lower the costs of trade and narrow the band
of inaction. That is, |𝑐 𝑎 | < |𝑐 𝑏 |. A secondary outcome is that in the outer regime, reversion
to the thresholds [𝑐 𝜏 , −𝑐 𝜏 ] may be faster after the free trade agreement. Figure 2.2
illustrates. These are empirical questions which we turn to shortly.

2.4 Data, Estimation Strategy, and Empirical Results
We introduce the data we use to study the effects of free trade agreements on market
integration below. Then, we turn to a discussion of the estimation strategy for a selfexciting TAR model without a threshold break and present the empirical results. We then
adapt the estimation strategy to include a break in the threshold at the FTA date and present
the results.

2.4.1 Data
Our data on prices and exchange rates comes from the IMF's International Financial
∗
Statistics database. We lack disaggregated data on prices 𝑝𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑝𝑗,𝑡
and instead use an

aggregated price index. We use the consumer price index (CPI) where 𝑝𝑡 is the CPI for
South Korea and 𝑝𝑡∗ is the CPI for the FTA partner we study. To convert 𝑝𝑡∗ to home
currency for each FTA partner, we construct 𝑠𝑡 as the Korean won per unit of the FTA
partner currency. These cross rates are calculated using nominal dollar-based exchange
rates for South Korea and the FTA partners. The (aggregate) home-foreign price
differential between South Korea and each of the nine FTA partners is defined as
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𝑟𝑡 = log(𝑝𝑡 ) − log(𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑡∗ ) and where 𝑞𝑡 is the demeaned value of 𝑟𝑡 26.
We have monthly data covering the period January 1998 - April 201727.The sample
period start date corresponds to the commencement of the floating exchange rate period in
South Korea, after the Asian Financial Crisis. Our choice of free trade agreements for
inclusion in our study was motivated by sample size considerations. We want to have a
minimum of 45 observations on either side of the free trade agreement. Therefore, we
selected the six FTAs by country with the earliest start dates as reported earlier in Table
2.1: Chile (2004), Singapore (2006), India (2010), Peru (2011), United States (2012) and
Turkey (2013). For the three FTAs by trade blocs, we are limited to study the three
operative agreements: EFTA (2006), ASEAN (2007), and EU (2011). Given that there are
forty-two countries across the three FTA by trade blocs, we choose to study the country
with the highest trade volume from each of the three agreements. From the EFTA, we chose
Norway, from the ASEAN agreement, Indonesia, and from the EU, Germany. In all, there
are nine countries in our study.

2.4.2

Self-Exciting Threshold Autoregressive Model without a Threshold

Break
We begin by estimating the arbitrage model with trade costs from Section 3 using
a self-exciting Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) Model assuming no break in the threshold.
A TAR model explicitly allows for differences in the behavior of a time series variable

26

The demeaned real exchange rate is used since it takes out the influence of base year
effects in the aggregate price indices. 𝑞𝑡 estimated as the residual in a regression of 𝑟𝑡 on a
constant.
27
The start date for Germany is one year later.
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relative to one or more thresholds and naturally accommodates piece-wise non-linearities
that are induced by the presence of trade costs.
As in Sarno et al. (2004), we assume the convergence rate of 𝑞𝑡 is symmetric above
and below the threshold. In a TAR model, assignment of 𝑞𝑡 to the inner regime or the outer
regime is based on an indicator function that determines the regime. The indicator function
for a self-exciting TAR is a d-period lag of 𝑞𝑡 relative to the threshold c. This captures 𝑑𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 stickiness in prices arising from contracts.
By assuming symmetry in the behavior of 𝑞𝑡 outside the upper and lower threshold
along with symmetry in the upper and lower thresholds, the two outer regimes can be
treated as a single “outer regime” defined by c. Thus, it is convenient to write the indicator
function using the absolute value of 𝑞𝑡−𝑑 relative to c. If |𝑞𝑡−𝑑 | > 𝑐, we let the indicator
function I(|qt−d | > c) = 1 and assign 𝑞𝑡 to the outer regime. When the condition is not
satisfied, I(|qt−d | > c) = 0 and 𝑞𝑡 is assigned to the inner regime.
Before we consider the effects of free trade agreements on trade costs, we need to
first ascertain whether trade costs exist. We do this by testing whether a self-exciting TAR
model provides a better fit for 𝑞𝑡 than a linear autoregressive specification with p lags which is the null model. Since tests for arbitrage are commonly specified using the
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) specification, we express the AR(p) and TAR models as:
𝑝−1

𝛥𝑞𝑡 = 𝛽𝑞𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜙𝑖 ∆𝑞𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜖𝑡
𝑖=1
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(2.11)

𝑝−1

∆𝑞𝑡𝑘 = [𝛽 𝑖𝑛 𝑞𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜙𝑖𝑖𝑛 ∆𝑞𝑡−𝑖 ](1 − 𝐼(|(|q t−d | > c)
𝑖=1

(2.12)
𝑝−1

+[𝛽 𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑞𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜙𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑡 ∆𝑞𝑡−𝑖 ]𝐼(|(|q t−d | > c) + 𝜀𝑡𝑘
𝑖=1

where p is the lag length, 𝑘 refers to the two regimes – inner or outer, d is the delay
parameter used in specifying the indicator function where 1 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑑, and c is an imputed
measure of trade costs. The speed of mean reversion in the AR(p) model is (𝛽 + 1) = 𝜌
where 𝜌 is the sum of the autocorrelation coefficients in the AR(p) model and captures the
dynamics in the lag structure; in the TAR model 𝜌𝑖𝑛 = (𝛽 𝑖𝑛 + 1) is a measure of the speed
of reversion in the inner regime and 𝜌𝑜𝑢𝑡 = (𝛽 𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 1) is a measure of the speed of mean
reversion in the outer regime28.
The estimation strategy for detecting a threshold has two parts. The first part
involves pre-determining the lag length for the AR(p) and TAR models and then estimating
the TAR model for for each combination of [d, c] in (2.12). The TAR model based on the
[d, c] yielding the minimum sum of squared residuals is then used to construct a sup-Wald
test statistic against the null AR(p) model29. Since c is not identified under the null model,
the distribution for the Wald test is non-standard30. Thus, in the second part, a distribution
of Wald statistics must be generated by bootstrapping. The distribution of Wald statistics

28

In this paper, we assume 𝑞𝑡 is a covariance stationary variable as our main objective is
to determine whether trade costs c decline after the introduction of an FTA. We offer
reasons for our assumption and a discussion of the effect of an FTA on the speed of mean
reversion in Section 2.4.3 However, for the interested reader, we will report standard t-tests
for 𝜌 = 1.
29
It may be useful to think of (2.11) as the restricted version of (2.12)
30
Hansen (1996) notes that since d is discrete and super-consistent, it can be treated as
identified under the null
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is then used to determine the p-value associated with the sup-Wald test. We outline these
steps below:
1. Pre-determine the lag-length p for the linear AR(p) and the non-linear TAR
model using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz’s Bayesian
Information Criterion (SBIC), and set the same for both models31.
2.

Estimate the TAR model over each combination of [d, c]. We search over
d=1,2,..,p. The grid search over c requires that we set a minimum and a
maximum value, and an increment for the grid search. We set 𝑐 𝑚𝑖𝑛 at the
15𝑡ℎ percentile of and 𝑐 𝑚𝑖𝑛 at the 85𝑡ℎ percentile of 𝑞𝑡 . The increment is set at
0.005. In all, the grid search runs d∙c regressions of (2.12).

3.

Choose the combination of d and c that minimize the sum of squared residuals
from
1
𝑇

(2.12)

as

(𝑐̂ , 𝑑̂ ) = argmin 𝜎̂ 2 (𝑐, 𝑑)

and

where

𝜎̂ 2 (𝑐̂ , 𝑑̂) =

∑𝑇𝑡=1 𝜖̂𝑡 ( 𝑐̂ , 𝑑̂ )2 .

4. Construct the sup-Wald test 𝑊𝑇 for a threshold effect as sup- 𝑊𝑇 =
̃ 2 −𝜎
̂ 2 (𝑐̂,𝑑̂)
𝜎
]
̂ 2 (𝑐̂,𝑑̂)
𝜎

𝑇[

where T is the sample size and 𝜎̃ 2 is the sum of squared residuals

from (2.11).
Because 𝑊𝑇 does not follow a standard chi-square distribution, Hansen(1997; 1999; 2017)
recommends bootstrapping to generate a distribution of Wald statistics as below:

31

We choose the smaller of the lag-length p from the AIC and SBIC. Sarno et al. (2004)
show, using Monte Carlo simulation, that tests for a threshold effect perform well against
the null of linearity if the threshold autoregressive process is characterized by a small
autoregressive order, regardless of the size of c.
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1. Generate n i.i.d. draws 𝑢𝑡 from the N(0,1) distribution.
2. Set 𝑦𝑡∗ = 𝑢𝑡 𝜖̂𝑡 where 𝜖̂𝑡 are the OLS residuals from the null model in (2.11).
3. Using the observations (𝑦𝑡∗ , 𝑞𝑡−1 , ∑𝑝−1
𝑖=1 ∆𝑞𝑡−𝑖 ), estimate (2.11) and (2.12). Then,
using the sum of squared residuals from each model - 𝜎̃ ∗2 and 𝜎̂ ∗2 - construct the
bootstrapped Wald-statistic as:

𝑊𝑇𝑏 = 𝑇[

𝜎̃ ∗2 − 𝜎̂ ∗2 (𝑐̂ , 𝑑̂ )
]
𝜎̂ ∗2 (𝑐̂ , 𝑑̂ )

(2.13)

4. Repeat 1 - 3 10,000 times in order to obtain a sample 𝑊𝑇𝑏 (1),..., 𝑊𝑇𝑏 (10,000) of
bootstrapped Wald-statistics, arranged in descending order.
5. Calculate the asymptotic p-value for sup-𝑊𝑇 by counting the number of
bootstrap samples for which 𝑊𝑇𝑏 exceeds the observed sup-𝑊𝑇 .
Table 2.4 presents the results of this two-part estimation where our focus is on whether a
threshold c exists. The values of c along with the delay parameter d and the lag length p
corresponding to the sup-𝑊𝑇 statistic are reported32.We see that for five of South Korea's
FTA partners that we study - Chile, the United States, Turkey, Norway, and Germany - the
Wald statistics are significant at the 2 percent marginal significance level or better and
indicate that the self-exciting TAR model with reported threshold c provides a better fit for
𝑞𝑡 than the AR(p) model. Since c represents the percentage difference between the mean

Since our main interest is in whether a threshold exists, we present the estimates of 𝜌𝑖𝑛
and 𝜌𝑜𝑢𝑡 but do not discuss them in this Section.
32
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price differential with trade costs and the mean price differential with no trade costs, we
may say that South Korea's trade costs with Chile, the United States, Turkey, Norway, and
Germany are respectively 5 percent, 16 percent, 14.5 percent, 14 percent, and 5 percent.
For the remaining four countries, there is no evidence of a threshold effect. There
are two possible interpretations according to Imbs et al. (2003): (i) c is so small (or zero)
that all |𝑞𝑡 | effectively reside in the outer regime; or (ii) c is so large that all |𝑞𝑡 | reside in
the inner regime, making the threshold effect undetected.

2.4.3 Self-Exciting Threshold Autoregressive Model with a Broken Threshold
We now wish to investigate whether free trade agreements between South Korea
and its FTA partners have led to increased market integration. Two aspects of market
integration we expect to see after the FTA include: (1) a decline in trade costs c, i.e
𝑐 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 < 𝑐 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 ; and (2) an increase in the speed of convergence of the home-foreign
price differential 𝑞𝑡 toward the threshold in the outer regime, i.e. a 𝜌𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟,𝑜𝑢𝑡 <
𝜌𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒,𝑜𝑢𝑡 . To examine these hypotheses, we incorporate one additional feature into the
TAR model: a break in the threshold c occurring at time τ – the date the FTA is adopted.
This is a novel feature of our work.
The goal of the estimation strategy is to compare the fit of a TAR model, allowing
for a break in the threshold at the FTA date, to the null model of an unbroken threshold33.

33

An alternative test could be constructed with the AR(p) model over the full sample as
the null, instead of the unbroken TAR. We choose the null of a TAR model because it is
predicated on the existence of trade costs.
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Candidate countries for this investigation are South Korea's five FTA partners for which
the sup-Wald test in Section 2.4.2 showed a threshold exists.
We begin by first establishing that for these five FTA partners, the null of a linear
AR(p) model is rejected in favor of a TAR model in both the pre-FTA and post-FTA subsamples. This allows for the possibility that the c may differ before and after the FTA. The
estimation strategy is the same as in Section 2.4.2 except that it is applied to the two subperiods. As before, the best fit TAR model for the period before the FTA and the best fit
TAR model after the FTA are identified as the ones for which the sup-Wald statistic leads
to rejection of the AR(p) model using a bootstrapped distribution of Wald test statistics,
here generated for the pre- and post-FTA sub-samples.
Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 report the results for a TAR model for Chile, the United
States, Turkey, Norway, and Germany, over the sub-sample before the FTA and for the
sub-sample after the FTA 34 . As it turns out, if we are willing to accept a 10 percent
significance level or better, Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 show that there is preliminary evidence
that all five countries experienced a break in the threshold c after the FTA went into effect.
For example, for Chile before the FTA, the bootstrapped p-value favors a TAR model with
a threshold c = 0.21 over a linear AR model; after the FTA, the bootstrapped p-value also
favors a TAR model, but with a lower threshold c = 0.05. However, we do not yet know
whether a broken threshold model is significantly different from an unbroken threshold
model.

34

Results for the full set of FTA partners is available upon request.
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In the next step, for each of the five countries, the best-fit pre-FTA and post-FTA
TAR models are “joined” (yielding the full sample) and tested against the best fit, unbroken
threshold TAR model from Section 2.4.2. These “best-fit” specifications are based on the
regressions yielding the minimum sum of squared errors over a joint grid search on [d,c].
In this case, since our null model is an unbroken threshold where c is identified, there is no
nuisance parameter and we do not need to bootstrap a distribution for our Wald test. If the
“joined” TAR with a break in the threshold c after passage of the FTA has a significantly
better fit than the TAR model without a threshold break based on the Wald test, we may
conclude that a threshold break occurs at the FTA date. The results are presented in Table
2.7.
Table 2.7 indicates that the self-exciting TAR with a threshold-break at the FTA
date is a better fit than an unbroken threshold model for Chile, the United States, Turkey,
Norway and Germany. Looking at Table Table 2.5 and Table 2.6, we see that for each of
these countries, c has declined; there is evidence that free trade agreements have led to a
reduction in the costs associated with international trade. For the FTAs by country, c
declined from 0.21 to 0.05 for Chile, from 0.16 to 0.02 for the United States and from 0.16
to 0.025 for Turkey. For South Korea's free trade agreement with the EFTA and with EU,
we see that c has a more modest decline from 0.085 to 0.08, and from 0.045 to 0.04,
respectively. The declines in trade costs suggest that free trade agreements between South
Korea and these five FTA partners has enhanced market integration.
Finally, we report the point estimates (𝜌𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒,𝑜𝑢𝑡 ) and (𝜌𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟,𝑜𝑢𝑡 ) for the periods
delineated by the FTA. We view evidence of a threshold break as loosely indicative of a
change in the speed of adjustment since threshold breaks are identified by changes in 𝛽
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(and by extension 𝜌). We therefore expect to see a rise in the speed of mean reversion after
the FTA, 𝜌𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟,𝑜𝑢𝑡 < 𝜌𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒,𝑜𝑢𝑡 . Results from Table Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 for Chile,
the United States, Turkey, Norway and Germany are mixed. Based on the point estimates
only, it appears that for the United States, the speed of adjustment increased after the FTA.
However, for Chile, Turkey, Norway and Germany, the speed of adjustment appears to
have declined after the FTA.
We do not enter the debate about whether these point estimates differ from 1.0.
Despite the fact that estimates of 𝛽 are super-consistent under a unit root null, we are
agnostic about whether 𝑞𝑡 contains a unit root. It is well-known that there are power
problems rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root35.These power problems mean that
tests for a unit root are sensitive to sample size, and are related to sample period length,
both of which are concerns with our data. Since our data is monthly beginning in 1998 and
ending in April 2017, and South Korea's free trade agreements were not adopted until 2004
or later, we are limited in the sample size post-FTA. We have pre-FTA sample size
constraints as well because we chose the period commencing with a floating exchange rate
in South Korea in 1998. Moreover, the outer regime sample size is further limited by the
size of the inner regime. For these reasons, tests for evidence of market integration that rely
on estimates of the pace of mean reversion may not be informative.

2.5 Conclusion
South Korea with its significant dependency on trade, has initiated FTAs with many
countries since 2004 when it adopted its first FTA with Chile. We investigate whether

35

Caner et al. (2001) develop tests for a unit root in a two-regime TAR model.
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South Korea's free trade agreements have promoted market integration. We study nine of
South Korea's free trade agreements. Because free trade agreements eliminate or reduce
tariffs on international trade, trade costs should decline. In terms of arbitrage theory, the
band of inaction owing to trade costs should shrink after the passage of an FTA.
Our paper makes two contributions. First, we add to the literature on market
integration by adapting a “band” TAR model to include a break at the FTA date. For five
of nine of South Korea's free trade partners that we study - Chile, the United States and
Turkey which have bilateral FTAs with South Korea, and Norway and Germany - which
are part of FTA with trade blocs, we report evidence of a break in the threshold of a TAR
model at the FTA date. We find that the threshold declines after the FTA and conclude that
trade costs have declined. We interpret this as evidence that market integration has
advanced for these five countries.
Another effect of free trade agreements is that the pace of convergence in the homeforeign price differential should increase after the FTA as the band of inaction narrows.
Here, we find little evidence to support that market integration has been achieved. We
interpret this latter finding more cautiously in terms of its implications about market
integration since we considered point estimates of the speed of mean reversion only.
Second, we believe that we have contributed to the literature on market integration
by adapting a modelling and test strategy that can be used to study market integration. Our
strategy uncovers what happens to the costs of trade after an event, like free trade
agreements that is expected to foster greater competition, occurs. In addition, our paper

64

offers a strategy that may have application for researchers using threshold autoregressive
(TAR) models where a structural break in thresholds is hypothesized.
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Table 2.1

Effective Dates of South Korea’s Free Trade Agreements

FTAs by country

FTA

Effective
Date

Countries

Effective
Date

FTA

Effective
Date

KOR-Chile

2004.04.01

KORSingapore

2006.03.02

KORIndia

2010.01.01

KOR-Peru

2011.08.01

KOR-U.S.

2012.03.15

KORTurkey

2013.05.01

KORAustralia

2014.12.12

KORCanada

2015.01.01

KORChina

2015.12.20

KOR-New
Zealand

2015.12.20

KORVietnam

2015.12.20

KOR2016.07.15
Colombia

FTAs by trade blocs

FTA

Effective
Date

FTA

Effective
Date

FTA

Effective
Date

KOREFTA(4)

2006.09.01

KORASEAN(10)

2007.06.01

KOREU(28)

2011.07.01
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Table 2.2

Tariff Elimination Schedules: FTAs by country

FTA

Countries

% of Imports that Tariffs Eliminated (year 0)

South Korea

87.2%

Chile

41.8%

South Korea

59.7%

Singapore

100%

South Korea

80.0%

U.S.

82.1%

South Korea

75.2%

Australia

90.9%

South Korea

49.9%

China

20.1%

KOR-Chile

KOR-Singapore

KOR-U.S.

KOR-Australia

KOR-China
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South Korea

91.3%

Vietnam

86.3%

KOR-Vietnam

South Korea
KOR-India

8 years for zero tariffs
India

South Korea

85.54%

Peru

67.86%

South Korea

80.0%

Turkey

65.0%

South Korea

81.9%

Canada

76.4%

South Korea

48.3%

New Zealand

92.0%

KOR-Peru

KOR-Turkey

KOR-Canada

KOR-New Zealand
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South Korea

82.38%

Colombia

60.64%

KOR-Colombia

Table 2.3

Tariff Elimination Schedules: FTAs by trade blocs

FTA

Countries

% of Imports that Tariffs Eliminated (year 0)

South Korea

86.3%

EFTA

100%( excluding agricultural products)

South Korea

70%

ASEAN

Decrease in Tariffs on 50% of total imports
by 0-5%

South Korea

81.7%

EU

76.6%

KOR-EFTA

KORASEAN

KOR-EU
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Table 2.4

Full-Sample Estimates of Self-Exciting TAR Model

FTAs by country

Country

c

sup-Wald
statistics

[ρ = β + 1]†

p

R2

Obs
ρ in

d

Bootstrapped pvalue

ρ out

3
Chile

Peru

India

Singapore

U.S.

0.05

14.55***
229

1.36***

0.96
***

0.20

1

0.01

2

2.94

0.055

228

0.86

0.96**

0.21

2

0.41

3

5.37

0.09

228

1.03

0.98**

0.17

1

0.31

3

13.91

0.04

228

1.22

0.98**

0.24

1

0.23

4

32.66***

0.16

228

0.98

0.97*

1

0.31
0.00
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3
Turkey

0.145

25.68***
229

1.06

0.96***

0.27

3

0.01

FTAs by trade blocs

Country

c

sup-Wald
statistics

[ρ = β + 1]†

p

R2

Obs
ρ in

d

Bootstrapped pvalue

ρ out

4
Indonesia

Norway

Germany

0.21

16.49
228

1.01

0.95**

0.25

1

0.65

3

13.74**

0.14

229

0.99

0.96**

0.15

3

0.02

2

9.27**

0.05

218

1.25***

2

0.96**

0.11
0.02

Significance levels are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10. †H0 : ρ = 1.
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Table 2.5 Sub-Sample Estimates of Two Regime SETAR(p,d)
for FTAs by country

Before FTA

Country

c

sup-Wald
statistics

[ρ = β + 1]†

p

R2

Obs
ρ in

d

bootstrapped
p-value

ρ out

3
Chile

U.S.

Turkey

0.21

10.29*
69

0.99

0.91***

0.40

1

0.06

4

28.01***

0.16

166

0.98

0.97*

0.33

1

0.00

3

25.46***

0.16

181

1.05

0.97*

0.30

3

0.01

After FTA

Country

c

sup-Wald
statistics

[ρ = β + 1]†

p

R2

Obs
ρ in

d

bootstrapped
p-value

ρ out

2
Chile

0.05

12.86**
160

1.67***

1

0.97*

0.12
0.02
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3
U.S.

Turkey

0.02

12.64**
62

0.87

0.96

0.35

2

0.02

2

8.49*

0.025

48

-0.10**

0.98

0.24

1

0.06

Significance levels are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10. †H0 : ρ = 1.
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Table 2.6 Sub-Sample Estimates of Two Regime SETAR(p,d)
for FTAs by trade blocs

Before FTA

Country

c

sup-Wald
statistics

[ρ = β + 1]†

p

R2

Obs
d

ρ in

ρ out

0.99

0.92**

bootstrapped
p-value

3
Norway

Germany

0.085

8.23*
101

0.26

2

0.09

2

13.72***

0.045

148

1.43***

0.95**

0.18

1

0.01

After FTA

Country

c

sup-Wald
statistics

[ρ = β + 1]†

p

R2

Obs
ρ in

d

bootstrapped
p-value

ρ out

1
Norway

0.08

5.83**
128

1.17*

0.99

0.04

1

0.03

1
Germany

0.04

1.48*
70

0.76

0.99

0.02

1

0.09

Significance levels are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10. †H0 : ρ = 1.
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Table 2.7 Wald Test Results for Threshold Break at FTA

FTAs with a country

Country

Wald statistics

Chile

12.98***

U.S.

8.45**

Turkey

8.18***

FTAs with regional trade blocs

Country

Wald statistics

Norway

4.36**

Germany

7.85***

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10
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Figure 2.1 Arbitrage Model with Trade Costs

Figure 2.2 Arbitrage Model with a Break in Trade Costs
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CHAPTER 3 DOES INFTLATION TARGETING MATTER FOR
INFLATION PERSISTENCE?36
3.1 Introduction
Inflation targeting is a practice that central banks around the world began to adopt
as early as 1990. New Zealand was the first adopter. Since then, 37 more countries –
developed and developing countries alike – have adopted inflation targeting as their
monetary framework. Inflation targeting policy was expected to lead to success on three
counts: (1) a decline in the level of inflation, (2) a reduction in the volatility of inflation,
and (3) a decline in inflation persistence, as a central bank publicly announced its
commitment to a target range for inflation. Under this regime, inflation expectations would
anchor around the target, further raising the probability that targeting would be successful.
However, studies are divided over whether the three outcomes have been realized.
At about the same time that inflation targeting began to gain traction in the 1990s,
a worldwide era of disinflation commenced. World average inflation over the period 197089 was approximately 15% and median inflation approximately 10%. In the subsequent
two decades, world inflation averaged approximately 12% and median inflation was
approximately 6%.

36

Lim, E.S. and J.B. Bass. To be submitted to International Journal of Central Banking.
77

Despite wide variation in country experience with inflation, there has been a general
decline in inflation over these two periods, with higher income countries experiencing
declines in inflation earlier than others. Explanations for the declines in inflation rates
included globalization which fostered competition and efficiency gains, advances in
technology which generated productivity gains, oil price declines, and counter-inflationary
monetary policy adoption borne out of an era of relatively high inflation 37 . These
explanations leave room to doubt whether any record of inflation success by inflation
targeting adopters can be attributed to their new monetary framework.
Studies of inflation targeting find heterogeneity in the inflation experience for
targeters and non-targeters. Some targeters see no significant impact of targeting on
inflation success metrics, while many non-targeters have experiences similar to successful
targeters. The studies vary in the countries and time period studied and the techniques used.
Some studies focus on countries in Europe or Asia; others focus on countries by income
status. Alternative techniques based on a linear autoregressive model have been used:
propensity score matching, median unbiased estimation, and panel estimation.
Autorgressive models with structural breaks and smooth transition non-linear models have
also been estimated. A consistent picture of the benefits of inflation targeting has not yet
emerged. However, there are no studies of inflation targeting to our knowledge that
examine inflation persistence by using a model that allows for threshold non-linearity at
the targeted inflation range.

37

Rogoff (2003) discusses factors underlying the global disinflation that began in the
1990s.
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In this paper, we use a threshold autoregressive (TAR) model to study the period of
inflation targeting. This model is particularly apt for inflation targeters yet, to our
knowledge, has not been deployed 38. Inflation targeters state a range within which the
inflation target resides. When inflation is outside the range, more aggressive monetary
policy is pursued than when inside the range; at the same time, the impact of anchored
expectations is operative. We focus primarily on inflation persistence – an issue raised in
Benati (2008) in the debate over the effect of changes in monetary regimes. Using a select
sample of inflation targeters, we compare estimates of inflation persistence from a TAR
model over the inflation targeting sample to estimates of persistence from a linear
autoregressive model for the period prior to the adoption of inflation targeting. We further
examine differences in inflation persistence across level of development and for countries
that have ever experienced hyperinflation. To address issues raised that events unrelated to
inflation targeting policy could explain our findings, we include a select set of seven nonIT targeters in our study and conduct a counterfactual exercise. Our study relies on monthly
data from 1974-2017, making our study one of a few on inflation targeting that includes
data well-past the end of the worldwide recession.
We find that in countries where central banks have adopted inflation targeting,
measures of inflation performance improve. Countries achieve lower rates of inflation,
have less volatile inflation rates, and experience a drop in inflation persistence. We conduct
counterfactual exercises to address the possibility that these declines would have occurred
absent inflation targeting by examining the inflation performance in seven countries that

38

Gregoriou et al. (2006) estimate a logistic and exponential smoothed transition
autoregressive model for deviations of the inflation rate from the point target. The inflation
target ranges are not considered.
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are not inflation targeters but are similar in terms of income per capita and data availability.
We impose a breakdate of 1990 in our counterfactual exercise which is commonly quoted
as the demarcation line between the two eras of inflation performance around the world,
irrespective of monetary regime.
We find the break is significant and that inflation performance for our set of nontargeters also improves. However, a comparison of the inflation performance between
inflation targeters and non-targeters (using an imposed breakdate of 1990), reveals that
there are stronger improvements among the inflation targeting countries. In a second
counterfactual, we consider whether 1990 is the optimal breakdate for studying the
inflation performance of our non-targeting countries before and after 1990. Using an
endogenous break search methodology, we find dispersion in breakdates with only one
country having an optimal break date within three years of 1990. We interpret the variation
in breakdates among non-targeters to be inconsistent with the story that inflation rates
around the world were in decline beginning with the decade of 1990. We conclude that the
practice of inflation targeting which commenced in 1990 and has been adopted by many
countries around the world in the two decades since then, has brought gains in inflation
performance. Our study contributes to the divide over whether central banks that have
adopted inflation targeting can expect to see positive changes in inflation dynamics. We
also contribute by offering a different model for estimating inflation when inflationtargeting is operative, and for using counterfactuals to investigate the robustness of our
conclusions.
In Section 3.2, we discuss inflation targeting and relevant literature. In Section 3.3,
we introduce the data and the set of countries we study. We provide a descriptive
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of

inflation rates among inflation targeters and our group of non-inflation targeters. In Section
3.4, we estimate two models of inflation depending on whether a country targets an
inflation rate or not. We report measures of persistence before and after the adoption of
inflation targeting for our targeters, and from a counterfactual exercise for non-targeters
where a breakdate of 1990 is imposed. We then investigate the optimality of the
counterfactual breakdate. We conclude in Section 3.5.

3.2 Inflation Targeting and Relevant Literature
In the 1960s, Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968) argued that there is no long-run
trade-off between inflation and output. The acceptance of this view prompted some central
banks around the world to publicly commit to a medium-term goal of price stability as a
pathway to lower inflation, which is called Inflation Targeting. Under this framework, the
central bank commits to keeping the inflation rate within a band around an inflation rate
objective39. Central banks are expected to hit the targeted inflation rate on average over the
medium term 40 . Further, the targeted inflation rate is determined based on current and
projected future economic conditions. This framework gives central banks the discretion
to react to shocks and allow for deviations from the goal in the short run.

39

According to The Centre for Central Banking Studies Handbook No.29 "State of the Art
of Inflation Targeting-2012" published by the Bank of England, most industrialized
countries have inflation targets of 1%-3%. Some non-industrialized countries also have
inflation targets in this range: 2% in Peru; 2% in the Czech Republic, and 2.5% in Poland.
One country has a target above 5%: Ghana's target rate is 8.7%.
40
Generally, developed-country-IT targeters set a mid-point target rate of inflation of 2%
with a band of ±1%. The target rates and ranges of developing-country-IT targeters are
more heterogeneous. See Hammond et al. (2012) and Roger (2010) for more detail.
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Two features that distinguish inflation targeting frameworks from other monetary
policy frameworks are high transparency and accountability. Central banks that have
adopted inflation targeting policy frequently communicate with the government and with
the public. Central banks publish The Inflation Report which contains information on the
stated goals of a central bank along with limitations of their policy. The Inflation Report
presents numerical values of inflation targets, why central banks chose the targeted
inflation rate, how the inflation target can be achieved under current economic conditions,
and reasons why the actual inflation rate deviates from the target. (See Bernanke (1999)).
Such transparency is expected to make it easier for the central bank to move the inflation
rate toward its goal faster, and to keep it within the targeted range once the goal is achieved.
Because IT policy increases transparency, it is also expected to increase the accountability
of a central bank41. Inflation targeting is thus expected to reduce the level and volatility of
inflation. For this reason, some countries with already low rates of inflation like Thailand
and Sweden, adopted IT policy.
Inflation targeting may also reduce the persistence of inflation. Mishkin (2007) argues
that inflation expectations are a key driver of inflation dynamics and that the pursuit of
more aggressive monetary policy to control inflation may help anchor the public's
expectation of inflation. Yigit (2010) argues that when inflation expectations are more
heterogeneous, inflation exhibits longer memory 42 . Because inflation targeters are

41

See Hammond et al. (2012) for more detail on accountability and transparency. Bernanke
et al. (1997) note that New Zealand has the strongest accountability of any central bank
because the government has the right to dismiss the Reserve Bank's governor if the inflation
target is not achieved.
42
Levin et al. (2004), Siklos (1998) and Yigit (2010) find that inflation expectations among
the public have decreased after IT policy.
82

operationally independent from the government, monetary policy actions are more
credible 43 . Thus, operational independence may help make inflation expectations less
diffuse, too. If inflation targeting helps to anchor the public’s inflation expectation around
the point target, the public may be less likely to react to temporary shocks to inflation,
leading to lower inflation persistence under an inflation targeting regime44.
The effect of IT policy on inflation performance, however, is not settled. Corbo et al.
(2001), Levin et al. (2004), Neumann et al. (2002) and Pétursson et al. (2004) find that IT
policy reduces the level and volatility of inflation for developed countries. However, Ball
et al. (2004), Brito et al. (2010) and Lin et al. (2007) find little to no effect among developed
countries. Several studies (e.g. Canarella et al. 2017; Lin et al. 2007; Lin et al. 2009) find
differential effects of IT policy on inflation performance among developed countries and
developing countries, while Lin et al. (2009) report favorable evidence among developing
countries. Mixed evidence is also reported on inflation persistence. Levin et al. (2004) find
inflation to be less persistent after IT policy among the earliest sixteen IT targeters, but not
among non-IT targeters. Ball et al. (2004) find smaller inflation persistence over time for
both IT targeters and non-IT targeters, supporting their argument that less persistent
inflation among IT targeters may not result from IT policy. Gerlach et al. (2012) presents
evidence of a decline in inflation persistence over time for both IT targeters and non-IT
targeters, but that the positive effects of IT policy are driven by Asia-Pacific countries. The

According to Hammond et al. (2012), “operational independence” is distinct from “goal
independence”, and legitimizes central bank independence. Goal independence is when a
central bank sets the inflation goal without consultation with the government. Not all
inflation targeters have goal independence.
44
Bratsiotis et al. (2015) introduce a theoretical model to explain how IT policy reduces
inflation persistence.
43
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effects of IT policy on inflation persistence among developed IT targeters are
comparatively clear: Baxa et al. (2014), Bratsiotis et al. (2015), Canarella et al. (2017) and
Siklos (1998) find that after IT policy, inflation is less persistent among developed IT
targeters – New Zealand, Canada, U.K. Sweden, Australia and Finland.
In contrast, the results are less clear among developing-country-IT targeters. Siklos
(2008) finds a decline in inflation persistence for Chile, Mexico, Hungary and the Czech
Republic, out of thirteen developing-country-IT targeters. Capistrán et al. (2009) report
that IT policy has positive effects on a decline in inflation persistence for a few less
developed IT targeters – Brazil and Mexico – but more persistent inflation for Chile and
Peru in Latin America. Filardo et al. (2010) find more persistent inflation for Thailand, the
Philippines and Indonesia after IT policy. However, Canarella et al. (2017) find no decline
in inflation persistence after IT policy among less developed IT targeters.

3.3 Data and Descriptive Analyses
As of January 2018, there are thirty-eight IT targeters with start dates ranging from
1990 - 201445. In order to achieve a reasonable sample size on either side of the IT-adoption
date, we select a set of countries that adopted inflation targeting on or before 2005. Further,
to increase comparability across developed and developing countries, we consider only
floating exchange rate countries to avoid interference that a fixed exchange rate objective

45

The inflation targeters include: Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Albania,
Armenia, Brazil, Colombia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India,
Indonesia, Israel, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Moldova, New Zealand, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay,
Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Norway, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Sweden, and United
Kingdom
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may play in a central bank's desire to achieve its inflation rate objective. Our country set
thus includes five developed IT targeters: Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, South
Korea, and Norway; and seven less developed IT targeters: Chile, South Africa, Thailand,
the Philippines, Indonesia, Poland and Brazil;
We construct inflation rates from monthly data on the consumer price index (CPI)
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and Organization for Economic CoOperation and Development (OECD)’s Statistics. The sample period covers January 1974
- October 2017. Because inflation rate goals are expressed on an annualized basis, we
transform monthly CPI data into annualized inflation rates using the natural log first
difference in the CPI.
Table 3.1 lists the IT policy effective year and each IT targeter’s inflation rate target
level. While most IT targeters set an inflation target within a range, the U.K. and Sweden
set a point target level without a range, explicitly. In practice, both countries allow inflation
rate to move around a target level (2%) with ±1% ranges. IT targeters such as South Africa
and Thailand announce target ranges of 3% − 6%, and 0.5%− 3%, respectively, without
stating a point target.
Figure 3.1 shows the experience with inflation before and after the adoption of
inflation targeting for our five developed countries. In general, the figures provide
anecdotal support for the idea that inflation targeting has reduced the average level of
inflation. For most developed IT targeters, inflation rates have declined and reached the
target band set by the central banks. Figure 3.2 show and Figure 3.3 the experience with
inflation before and after IT policy is implemented for five developing countries that have

85

no record of hyperinflation and for two developing countries that have had hyperinflation.
These figures also lend support to the idea that inflation targeting has brought inflation
rates down with little movement outside the target range.
To address issues raised about events unrelated to the adoption of inflation targeting
but that could explain our findings, we include seven non-IT targeters in our study. The
choice of countries for the counterfactual exercises is not easy. Conclusions about the
“treatment effect” (i.e. inflation targeting) necessarily depend on the characteristics of the
untreated group. In cross-country time series studies like ours, the 'treatment' can occur at
different points in time and across different countries, making it difficult to attribute any
results to the 'treatment' alone. Moreover, we must consider the availability of data prior to
counterfactual break dates that we test. With these issues in mind, we choose countries that
are similar in terms of income per capita and inflation experience to the set of inflation
targeters we study, and that have a sufficient number of observations on either side of the
breakdate. The developed countries used in our counterfactual analysis are: United States,
Switzerland, and Denmark; and the developing countries are: Malaysia, Kenya, Bolivia,
and Ecuador. Of the developing countries, Bolivia and Ecuador have experienced
hyperinflation. Figures 3.4 – Figure 3.6 show the inflation experience of the non-targeters.
A counterfactual break date is set at 1990, the date associated with worldwide disinflation.

3.3.1 The Effects of IT policy on the Average of Inflation rates
Table 3.2 reports the average inflation rates for developed countries and less
developed countries among IT targeters, both pre-and post- IT policy. The column labeled
p-value gives the significance level for a test of the difference in the mean inflation rates
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over the two periods. We find that all twelve inflation targeters show a statistically
significant decline in the average inflation rates after IT policy begins.
We also investigate whether the seven non-IT-targeters experience a decline in the
average inflation rates, even though they have not adopted IT policy. To do this, we impose
our counterfactual date of 1990. We report average inflation rates over pre- and post- 1990
in Table 3.3. Here, we see that average inflation rates have declined significantly in all nonIT targeters, except for Kenya.
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 show that in nearly all cases, the average level of inflation
has declined regardless of whether countries are IT targeters or non-IT targeters. There
may be other explanations for the decline in the inflation rates that we observe for IT
targeters. However, we can see that the decline in average inflation rates among IT targeters
is larger than among non-IT targeters. The difference in the decline in inflation rates across
IT-targeters and non-IT targeters may indicate that IT policy has positive effects.

3.3.2 The Effects of IT policy on Inflation Volatility
Next, we explore whether inflation rate volatility declined after the adoption date
of IT policy for IT-targeters and non-IT-targeters. Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 report the results.
We see the volatility of the inflation rates for nine out of the twelve IT targeters have had
a statistically significant decline, and four out of seven non-IT targeters experienced a
statistically significant decline in inflation volatility. In some cases, whether for ITtargeters or not, the reductions in volatility are sizable. Like our results for inflation, these
results raise the possibility that there are alternative explanations for the decline in inflation
rate volatility that we find among the IT-targeters.
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3.4 Estimation, Results, and Counterfactuals
We now turn our attention to measures of inflation persistence. Inflation persistence
is a measure of the sum of the impact of a white noise shock to inflation k periods ago on
current inflation. It is also referred to as the “memory” of a series. Estimates of inflation
persistence derive from running a linear autoregression of the form:
𝜋𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜌1 𝜋𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝜌𝑘 𝜋𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜈𝑡

(3.1)

where 𝜋𝑡 is a measure of inflation and ∑𝑘𝑖=1 𝜌𝑖 is a measure of inflation persistence.
Higher measures of persistence imply that the inflation rate will spend a longer time away
from its mean. Persistence is also, therefore, a measure of the speed of reversion to the
mean. Greater persistence implies a slower speed of mean reversion; lower persistence
implies a faster speed of mean reversion.
The inflation rates of countries with central banks that adopt a monetary framework
of inflation targeting are hypothesized to exhibit lower persistence and faster speeds of
mean reversion after inflation targeting has commenced. A corollary is that inflation
targeters will have a better record of inflation performance than non-adopters after inflation
targeting. To test these hypotheses, we estimate two models: a linear autoregressive (AR)
model for periods and countries where inflation targeting is not practiced, and a Threshold
Autoregressive (TAR) when inflation targeting is practiced. We also conduct
counterfactual exercises to check the robustness of our results.
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3.4.1 Inflation Persistence among Inflation Targeters: Before and After IT
Policy
We begin by estimating measures of persistence in the period before IT policy when
no target is in force. We model inflation for the pre-IT policy period using a linear
autoregressive linear AR (k) specification, re-parameterized as:
𝑘−1

𝜋𝑡 = 𝛼 + γ𝜋𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜙𝑖 ∆𝜋𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜖𝑡

(3.2)

𝑖=1

where 𝜋𝑡 is measured as the log first difference in the CPI, on an annualized basis
and is stationary46. 𝛼 is a constant, 𝜋𝑡−1 is the lagged inflation rate, and 𝜖𝑡 is white noise.
In this re-parameterization of the AR(k) model in (3.1), γ = ∑𝑘𝑖=1 𝜌𝑖 is the sum of
the k lags impact on inflation at time t. The coefficient estimate 𝛾̂ captures the degree of
persistence in the inflation rate and is therefore also an estimate of the pace of reversion
toward the mean inflation rate, α. Lower values of γ imply lower measures of persistence
and faster speeds of mean reversion.
For the period after the adoption of IT policy, we model inflation using a Threshold
Autoregressive Model. With inflation targeting, the thresholds in the TAR model are
explicit47.

46

ADF unit root test results show that 𝜋𝑡 is stationary across all countries for pre-and post
IT policy.
47
TAR models also allow for unknown thresholds, in which case the thresholds are
identified by a grid search. See Hansen (2017).
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They are the upper and lower limits of the targeted inflation range set by the central bank.
We define these thresholds as [𝜋 𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝜋 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ].
We assume that inflation persistence is symmetric above the maximum inflation
target rate 𝜋 𝑚𝑎𝑥 and below the minimum inflation target rate 𝜋 𝑚𝑖𝑛 48. Thus, when 𝜋𝑡 is
above 𝜋 𝑚𝑎𝑥 or below 𝜋 𝑚𝑖𝑛 , the inflation rate is in the ‘outer regime’. By assuming
symmetry in the behavior of 𝜋𝑡 above 𝜋 𝑚𝑎𝑥 and below 𝜋 𝑚𝑖𝑛 , the two outer regimes can be
treated as a single “outer regime.”
In a TAR model, assignment of 𝜋𝑡 to the outer (and inner) regime is based on an
indicator function that determines the regime. 𝑗 refers to the two regimes-inner or outer.
The indicator function bases regime assignment on a d-period lag of 𝜋𝑡 (which is discussed
below) relative to the thresholds. In the outer regime, if the indicator function satisfies
𝐼 (𝜋𝑡−𝑑 > 𝜋 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑜𝑟 𝜋𝑡−𝑑 < 𝜋 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ) = 𝐼(∙) = 1, then 𝜋𝑡 is assigned to the outer regime.
When the condition is not satisfied, 𝐼(∙) = 0 and 𝜋𝑡 is assigned to the inner regime. Our
TAR(k) model is specified as follows:
𝑘−1
𝑗
𝜋𝑡

= 𝛼 + [𝛽 𝜋𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜙𝑖𝑖𝑛 𝜋𝑡−𝑖 ](1 − 𝐼(∙))
𝑖𝑛

𝑖=1

(3.3)
𝑘−1
𝑗

+[𝛽 𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝜋𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜙𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝜋𝑡−𝑖 ]𝐼(∙) + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖=1

The non-linearity of the TAR model arises because the persistence of inflation
depends on whether the inflation rate is outside or inside the target band, giving rise to two

48

See Sarno et al. (2004) who investigated persistence in the real exchange rate using a
TAR model.
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estimates 𝛽 𝑖𝑛 and 𝛽 𝑜𝑢𝑡 . 49 The coefficient estimate 𝛽 𝑜𝑢𝑡 gives a measure of persistence
when inflation resides outside the inflation target range.
We expect that inflation targeting will reduce persistence in the inflation rate after
the adoption of IT policy when the inflation rate is outside the targeted range. Therefore,
we hypothesize that estimates of 𝛽 𝑜𝑢𝑡 from (3.3) will be less than estimates of 𝛾 from (3.2).
Figure 3.7 gives a stylized picture of how IT policy is expected to affect the level, volatility,
and persistence in the inflation rate.
TAR estimation proceeds in several steps. First, the lag length k in (3.3) must be
determined prior to estimating the model. Then, the “delay parameter” d and the threshold
values, both required for the indicator function, must be established. Because the delay
parameter is unknown, a grid search over d is done50. For each d, the identified TAR model
is tested against the null of a linear AR(k) model estimated over the same sample period51.
A selection criteria for the best fit TAR model is based on a sup-Wald test statistic. We
outline the steps below for TAR estimation:
1. Pre-determine the lag-length k for the TAR model using the Akaike Information

49

We expect that when inflation resides inside the targeted range, the speed of mean
reversion will be faster, 𝛽 𝑖𝑛 < 𝛽 𝑜𝑢𝑡 , or white noise. However, the difference between these
two estimates is not our main focus.
50
The grid search over d is constrained by 1 ≤ d ≤ k.
51
In TAR model, Hansen (1997; 1999) argues that since a value of threshold is not
identified under the null model, the distribution for the Wald test is non-standard.
Therefore, he suggests bootstrapping. However, we do not bootstrap for the following two
reasons: the value of threshold for this study is already identified since central banks of
each IT targeter explicitly announce their targeted inflation level; and Hansen (1996) notes
that since d is discrete and super-consistent, it can be treated as identified under the null
even though it is not actually identified.
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Criterion (AIC), and set it the same for the linear AR model. Estimate the model
over the post-IT policy sample period.
2. Estimate the null AR model in (3.2) using k from Step 1 over the post-IT policy
sample period. Save the sum of squared residuals 𝜎̃ 2
3. Estimate the TAR model in (3.3) over each d. We search over d=1,2,..,k.
4. Choose the d that minimizes the sum of squared residuals 𝜎̂ 2 (𝑑) from (3.3) as
1
𝑑̂ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝜎̂ 2 (𝑑) and 𝜎̂ 2 (𝑑) = 𝑇 ∑𝑇𝑡=1 𝜀̂𝑡 (𝑑̂ )2.

̃ 2 −𝜎
̂ 2 (𝑑̂ )
𝜎
]
̂ 2 (𝑑̂)
𝜎

5. Construct the sup-Wald test 𝑊𝑇 for a threshold effect as sup-𝑊𝑇 = 𝑇[

where T is the sample size and 𝜎̃ 2 is the sum of squared residuals from (3.2).
6. Based on sup-𝑊𝑇 , test whether the TAR model for the post-IT policy sample
period yields a better fit than the null AR model over the IT-policy sample
period.
Table 3.6 reports inflation persistence estimates from (3.2) before the adoption of
IT policy and from (3.3) after the adoption of IT policy for developed countries. Also
reported is the sup-𝑊𝑇 , statistic for model fit in the post-IT sample period. A F-test for
differences in inflation persistence – γ̂ 𝐴𝑅 = 𝛽̂ 𝑜𝑢𝑡 – is also reported. Table 3.7 reports the
same for developing countries that target inflation.
We see that for all inflation targeters, a TAR model for the post-IT policy sample
period yields a better fit than an autoregressive model based on the sup-𝑊𝑇 statistic.
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Second, in all cases except South Africa and Sweden52, inflation persistence declines after
inflation targeting. We also observe that for four of the developed countries, γ < 0. Benati
(2008) reports a similar finding among developed countries after implementing inflation
targeting. Our results for the inflation targeters that we study provide some confirmation
that inflation targeting reduces inflation persistence. In the next section, we conduct
counterfactuals to investigate the robustness of our findings.

3.4.2 Inflation Persistence among Non-Targeters: Counterfactuals
Our results from Section 3.4.1 provide support for the idea that inflation targeting
policy will lead to a reduction in the persistence of shocks to inflation. This result holds for
developed and developing countries, and even those that have had some history of
hyperinflation. However, debate over the benefits of inflation targeting counterclaim that
any reductions in the level, volatility, or the persistence of inflation are an artifact of
globalization, worldwide declines in oil prices, or a general anti-inflation attitude among
central banks. Indeed, a prevailing view attributed to Lucas (1976) that remains persistent
itself, is that inflation is structural; monetary frameworks are impotent at influencing the
dynamics of structurally-caused inflation.
In this section, we undertake a few counterfactual studies to examine inflation
persistence among the seven countries in our study that have not adopted inflation
targeting. Because there is no “pre- and post-IT policy” period to study, we artificially
impose a break date of 1990 – the often-cited date after which inflation rates around the
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For Sweden, γ̂ =-0.37. Its absolute value, however, implies higher inflation persistence
after inflation targeting.
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world begin to fall. The purpose of our first counterfactual exercise is to address the issue
that, independent of inflation targeting, inflation dynamics were changing around the
world. If non-inflation targeting countries exhibit a decline in inflation persistence after
1990, evidence of inflation targeting's impact on inflation persistence becomes more
questionable.
The breakdate of 1990, however, is itself a pre-selected counterfactual. To
overcome the pre-selection problem, we conduct a second counterfactual. Our second
counterfactual exercise is to use the endogenous search method of Zivot et al. (1992) for
each country. This method estimates (3.2), searching over a trimmed interior sample (70%)
for a break in 𝛼 (mean inflation) at a date that achieves the best model fit using a minimum
t-statistic. Critical values for the test are based on a null model that assumes no break in α
and a unit root in inflation, i.e. |γ| =1 in (3.2)53
If we find that the optimal breakdates vary by country and do not cluster around
1990 (±3 years), we may infer that changes in mean inflation and/or inflation persistence
of non-IT targeters are unrelated to a systemic decline in inflation rates. Instead, the optimal
break dates may correspond to country-specific events.
Results from the counterfactual exercise where the breakdate 1990 is imposed are
reported in Table 3.8 for developed countries and Table 3.9 for developing countries. In
the last column of each table, the optimal breakdate from the Zivot et al. (1992) search

53

Rejection of the null implies a structural break in mean inflation and additionally that
inflation is a stationary series, -1< γ <1. Critical values from Zivot et al. (1992) provide a
stronger test because they are based on an endogenous search methodology and a unit
root null.
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algorithm is reported. We begin by first discussing inflation persistence before and after
the counterfactual break date at 1990. For the developed country non-targeters, we see a
statistically significant decline (at the 10% level or better) in inflation persistence after
1990 across all three countries. This result suggests the plausibility that a systemic decline
in inflation rates (at least for developed countries) materialized around 1990. For the
developing country non-targeters, we find no statistically significant decline in persistence.
For Kenya, however, we observe that inflation persistence has increased and is
significantly different than pre-1990. For the developing countries, using the counterfactual
break at 1990 leaves little evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that a systemic
decline in inflation rates occurred around that time.
In the second counterfactual, we consider the optimal breakdates selected from the
search algorithm of Zivot et al. (1992), reported in the last column of Table 3.8 and Table
3.9. If we instead consider a 3-year window on either side of 1990 to allow for randomness
in country experience in the hypothesized worldwide decline in inflation, then the only
optimal breakdates from Tables 3.8 – Table 3.9 that coincide with the story that inflation
dynamics noticeably changed around 1990 is the case of Switzerland. A look at the optimal
break dates for the remaining countries shows no evidence that would be consistent with a
breakdate at or about 1990. These findings make circumspect the alternative explanation
that global disinflation around 1990 is responsible for findings that inflation targeting has
impacted inflation dynamics.
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3.5 Conclusions
Inflation targeting policy is a relatively new monetary framework that has spurred
interest among scholars and policymakers around the world since it was first adopted in
1990 by New Zealand. Two features of inflation targeting policy – transparency and
accountability – are expected to deliver lower inflation, less volatility, and faster reversion
to the targeted inflation rate. Many studies, beginning in the late 1990s, have investigated
inflation outcomes for adopters. It is fair to say that the conclusions are mixed and the
debate vigorous over whether the benefits have materialized, or are an artifact of worldwide
structural disinflation. We contribute to the debate by (1) studying a select set of countries,
(2) using the most up-to-date data available, (3) estimating a model that allows for
thresholds based on the inflation ranges prescribed by the central bank of each country;
and (4) conducting a variety of counterfactual exercises.
Our study includes twelve inflation targeters. For our counterfactual exercises, we
choose seven non-inflation targeters with incomes per capita similar to our set of inflation
targeters. Our data extends from January 1974 - October 2017. We investigate the impact
of inflation targeting policy on inflation persistence by estimating a non-linear threshold
autoregressive model for the post-targeting period and a linear autoregressive model for
the pre-targeting period and for non-targeters. Our use of a threshold autoregressive model
with thresholds based on the inflation target ranges is a new contribution to the inflation
targeting literature.
Using the TAR model, we find evidence that inflation targeting policy has brought
about declines in inflation persistence that are statistically significant when compared to
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persistence measures prior to inflation targeting. However, these results could have
alternative explanations. Thus, we conduct counterfactual exercises with our set of nontargets by estimating an auto regressive model with an imposed break date at 1990, the date
identified as the beginning of worldwide disinflation. We see that measures of persistence
have declined among four non-targets after 1990, raising questions about whether central
banks that have adopted inflation targeting have had meaningful impacts on inflation
behavior, irrespective of a global generalized decline in inflation. We then investigate the
imposed break at 1990 by using a search algorithm to identify the most plausible break
date in the inflation rates of the non-targets. We find that in all cases but one, the most
plausible break dates occur more than three years prior to, or after 1990.
Our findings lead us to conclude that inflation targeting policy has yielded benefits
to inflation performance, independent of other explanations. However, in the wake of the
worldwide recession of 2008, inflation rates have remained noticeably lower. Inflation
targeting policy may therefore lose ground as a choice for success in mitigating the effects
of adverse inflation.
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Table 3.1

Inflation Targeting Effective Year and Target Rate

Developed Country IT targeters

Country

IT Effective Year

Target rate

Canada

1991

2% (±1%)

U.K.

1992

2%

Sweden

1993

2%

South Korea

2001

3% (±1%)

Norway

2001

2.5% (±1%)

Developing Country IT targeters without Hyperinflation
Country

IT Effective Year

Target rate

Chile

1999

3% (±1%)

South Africa

2000

3% - 6%

Thailand

2000

0.5% - 3%

Philippines

2002

4% (±1%)

Indonesia

2005

5% (±1%)
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Developing Country IT targeters with Hyperinflation
Country

IT Effective Year

Target rate

Poland

1998

2.5% (±1%)

Brazil

1999

4.5% (±1%)

Source: Hammond et al. (2012) and Roger (2010).
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Table 3.2 Average Inflation Rate for IT targeters: Pre- and Post- IT Policy

Developed Country IT targeters
t-test statistics†
Country

Pre - IT policy

Post - IT policy

(p-value)
12.73***

Canada

6.94

1.84
(0.00)
11.81***

U.K.

9.19

2.03
(0.00)
11.86***

Sweden

7.90

1.28
(0.00)
7.26***

South Korea

8.39

2.54
(0.00)
6.99***

Norway

5.70

1.95
(0.00)

Developing Country IT targeters without Hyperinflation
t-test statistics†
Country

Pre - IT policy

Post - IT policy
(p-value)
9.67***

Chile

31.52

3.11
(0.00)
9.25***

South Africa

11.32

5.29
(0.00)
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5.25***
Thailand

5.68

2.12
(0.00)
6.82***

Philippines

10.59

3.81
(0.00)
3.60***

Indonesia

11.01

6.24
(0.00)

Developing Country IT targeters with Hyperinflation
t-test statistics†
Country

Pre - IT policy

Post - IT policy
(p-value)
8.73***

Poland

56.54

3.25
(0.00)
14.81***

Brazil

167.25

6.41
(0.00)

𝐻0 †: Ave 𝜋𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝐼𝑇 = Ave 𝜋𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐼𝑇 , where Ave 𝜋𝑡 is the average annual inflation rate.
Significance Levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p< 0.1

101

Table 3.3

Average Inflation Rate for Non-IT targeters: Pre- and Post-1990

Developed Country Non-IT targeters
t-test statistics †
Country

Pre - 1990

Post - 1990

(p-value)
10.24***

U.S.

6.25

2.41
(0.00)

10.78 ***
Denmark

7.63

1.83
(0.00)

5.40***
Switzerland

3.20

1.04
(0.00)

Developing Country Non-IT targeters without Hyperinflation
t-test statistics†
Country

Pre-1990

Post -1990
(p-value)
0.38

Kenya

11.99

11.38
(0.71)
2.40**

Malaysia

3.94

2.74
(0.02)
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Developing Country Non-IT targeters with Hyperinflation
t-test statistics†
Country

Pre - 1990

Post - 1990
( p-value)
10.55***

Bolivia

118.49

6.31
(0.00)
7.29***

Ecuador

53.25

17.14
(0.00)

𝐻0 †: Ave 𝜋𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝐼𝑇 = Ave 𝜋𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐼𝑇 , where Ave 𝜋𝑡 is the average annual inflation
rate.
Significance Levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p< 0.1
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Table 3.4

Inflation Volatility for IT targeters: Pre- and Post- IT Policy

Developed Country IT targeters
F-test Statistics†
Country

Pre - IT policy

Post - IT policy

(p-value)
1.20

Canada

4.71

4.31
(0.15)
4.34***

U.K.

9.24

4.43
(0.00)
2.36***

Sweden

7.71

5.02
(0.00)
6.79***

South Korea

10.95

4.20
(0.00)
1.23

Norway

6.20

5.58
(0.11)

Developing Country IT targeters without Hyperinflation
F-test Statistics†
Country

Pre - IT policy

Post - IT policy
(p-value)
83.70***

Chile

43.98

4.81
(0.00)
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2.46***
South Africa

8.29

5.44
(0.00)
2.11***

Thailand

8.62

5.94
(0.00)
11.75***

Philippines

13.38

3.90
(0.00)
2.40***

Indonesia

15.19

9.81
(0.00)

Developing Country IT targeters with Hyperinflation
F-test Statistics†
Country

Pre - IT policy

Post - IT policy
(p-value)
259.98***

Poland

93.97

5.83
(0.00)
130.00***

Brazil

92.83

113.71
(0.00)

𝐻0 †: Vol 𝜋𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝐼𝑇 = Vol 𝜋𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐼𝑇 , where Vol 𝜋𝑡 is the volatility of inflation rate
measured by standard deviation of inflation rate.
Significance Levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p< 0.1
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Table 3.5

Inflation Volatility for Non-IT targeters: Pre- and Post- 1990

Developed Country Non-IT targeters
F-test Statistics†
Country

Pre - 1990

Post - 1990

(p-value)
1.20

U.S.

4.38

3.99
(0.15)
3.91***

Denmark

8.18

4.13
(0.00)
1.25*

Switzerland

4.72

4.23
(0.08)

Developing Country Non-IT targeters without Hyperinflation
F-test Statistics†
Country

Pre-1990

Post -1990
(p-value)
0.54***

Kenya

14.49

19.64
(0.00)
2.07***

Malaysia

6.76

4.71
(0.00)

106

Developing Non-IT targeters with Hyperinflation
F-test Statistics†
Country

Pre-1990

Post -1990
(p-value)
531.98***

Bolivia

194.75

8.44
(0.00)
0.92

Ecuador

22.46

23.07
(0.87)

𝐻0 †: Vol 𝜋𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑒−1990 = Vol 𝜋𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−1990 , where Vol 𝜋𝑡 is the volatility of inflation rate
measured by standard deviation of inflation rate.
Significance Levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p< 0.1
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Table 3.6

Inflation Persistence for Developed IT targeters: Pre- and Post-IT policy

Developed Countries: IT Targeters
Pre-IT Policy - AR(k) Model

Post-IT Policy - TAR(k) Model

γ AR
Country

108

Canada

U.K.

Sweden

obs

203

215

227

γ AR = β OUT

k

β OUT

sup-Wald†

F-statistic‡

(std. error)

d

(std. error)

p-value

p-value

0.66***

4

0.12*

2.09*

25.71***

(0.09)

2

(0.06)

0.08

0.00

0.53***

3

-0.26**

24.47***

31.95***

(0.09)

2

(0.11)

0.00

0.00

0.13*

4

-0.37***

13.84***

15.61***

1

(0.11)

0.00

0.00

R2

k

4

0.24

2

0.22

1

0.02
(0.07)

outer obs

231

247

245

0.65***
South Korea

Norway

323

323

3

-0.09

21.23***

24.09***

(0.10)

2

(0.11)

0.00

0.00

0.57***

4

-0.33*

8.79***

21.11***

4

(0.18)

0.00

0.00

4

0.31

4

0.14

168

173

(0.08)
†H 0: AR(k) model is a better fit than TAR(k) model.
‡H 0: γ AR = β out . Significance Levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p< 0.1
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Table 3.7

Inflation Persistence for Developing IT targeters: Pre- and Post-IT policy
IT Targeters: Developing Countries without Hyperinflation
Pre-IT Policy - AR(k) Model
γ AR

Country

obs

k

R

2

0.93***
299

4

0.82

110

0.25***
311

3

0.04
0.38***

311

3

0.10
0.67***

335

4

0.34
0.61***

371

3

0.29
(0.10)

d

(std. error)

p-value

p-value

1

0.46***

4.43**

20.51***

1

(0.08)

0.04

0.00

3

0.53***

24.38***

3.92**

1

(0.11)

0.00

0.04

1

0.35***

10.91***

0.05

1

(0.10)

0.00

0.82

1

0.42***

12.36***

3.43*

1

(0.09)

0.00

0.06

1

0.18***

3.49*

12.85***

1

(0.06

0.06

0.00

155

(0.09)
Indonesia

F-statistic‡

150

(0.09)
Philippines

sup-Wald†

162

(0.09)
Thailand

β OUT

183

(0.07)
South Africa

k
outer obs

(std. error)
Chile

γ AR = β OUT

Post-IT Policy - TAR(k) Model

139

IT Targeters: Developing Countries with Hyperinflation
0.79***
Poland

Brazil

119

132

1

0.34***

3.44*

3.05*

(0.24)

1

(0.09)

0.06

0.08

0.90***

1

0.64***

9.73***

5.14**

1

(0.07)

0.00

0.02

3

0.47

2

0.83
(0.09)

210

178

†H 0: AR(k) model is a better fit than TAR(k) model.
‡H 0: γ AR = β out . Significance Levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p< 0.1
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Table 3.8

Inflation Persistence for Developed Non-IT Targeters: Counterfactual Break at 1990
Developed Countries: Non-IT Targeters
Pre-1990 - AR(k) model
γ before

Country

obs

k

γ after
R

2

obs

k

(std. error)
191

2

334

2

(0.06)

112
Denmark

191

3

12.03***
0.25

334

4

1981:10
0.00

0.10
0.09

Optimal Break
p-value

(0.08)

0.41***
Switzerland 191

R
0.35***

0.48

3.34*
0.12

1993:06

(0.13)

(0.11)

0.06

0.13*

-0.48***

16.17***

1

0.02
(0.08)

334

4

0.13
(0.13)

†H 0: γ before = γ after , Significance Levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p< 0.1

Zivot-Andrews
Test

F-statistic†
2

(std. error)

0.72***
U.S.

γ before = γ after

Post-1990 - AR(k) Model

1982:12
0.000

Table 3.9

Inflation Persistence for Developing Non-IT Targeters: Counterfactual Break at 1990
Developing Countries: Non-IT Targeters without Hyperinflation
Pre-1990 - AR(k) model

Post-1990 - AR(k) Model

γ before
Country

obs

γ after
R2

k

obs

(std. error)

-0.05
Kenya

113

Malaysia

0.002 329

4

Optimal Break
p-value

0.42***

191 1

11.14***
0.25

1994:05

(0.07)

(0.12)

0.00

0.22**

0.26***

0.10

191 1

0.06

334

1

(0.11)

Zivot-Andrews Test

F-statistic†
R2

k

(std. error)

γ before = γ after

0.13
(0.07)

1984:03
0.75

Developing Countries: Non-IT Targeters with Hyperinflation
0.84***
Bolivia

119 4

0.48***
0.55

336

3

(0.19)
119 1

334

4

1986:02
0.13

0..81***
0.28

(0.28)

0.16
(0.15)

0.58*
Ecuador

2.27

0.72
0.54

(0.06)

†H 0: γ before = γ after , Significance Levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p< 0.1

2001:02
0.40

(a) Canada

(b) U.K.

(c) Sweden

(d) South Korea

(e) Norway
Figure 3.1 Inflation rates for Developed IT targeters : Pre-and Post-IT policy
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(a) Chile

(b) South Africa

(c) Thailand

(d) Philippines

(e) Indonesia
Figure 3.2 Inflation rates for Developing IT targeters without Hyperinflation :Pre- and
Post-IT policy
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(a) Poland

(b) Brazil

Figure 3.3 Inflation rates for Developing IT targeters with Hyperinflation: Pre-and PostIT policy
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(a) United States

(b) Switzerland

(c) Denmark
Figure 3.4 Inflation rates for Developed Non-IT targeters: Counterfactual Break at 1990
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(a) Malaysia

(b) Kenya

Figure 3.5 Inflation rates for Developing Non-IT targeters without Hyperinflation:
Counterfactual Break at 1990

(a) Bolivia

(b) Ecuador

Figure 3.6 Inflation rates for Developing Non-IT targeters with Hyperinflation:
Counterfactual Break at 1990
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Figure 3.7 Inflation Persistence (Pre-IT policy vs Post-IT policy)
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APPENDIX A
GLS ESTIMATION PROCESS FOR DF-GLS
UNIT ROOT TEST FOR CHAPTER 1
𝑟̃1 = 𝑟1

𝑟̃1 = 𝑟1 − 𝑎∗ 𝑟𝑡−1,

𝑡 = 2, … . , 𝑇

𝑥1 = 1

𝑥𝑡 = 1 − 𝑎∗ ,

7

where 𝑎∗ = 1 − (𝑇)54

𝑟̃𝑡 = 𝛿1 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡

The OLS estimator 𝛿̂1 is used to remove the mean from r t ; and we have a new generated
variable as the following:
𝑞 ∗ = 𝑟𝑡 − 𝛿̂1

𝑎∗ = 1 + 𝑐̅/𝑇. 𝑐̅ should be -13.5 when there is a linear trend, but 𝑐̅ should be -7 when
there is no linear trend. Elliott et al. (1996) argue that the values of 𝑐̅ are chosen so that the
test achieves the power envelope against stationary stationary alternatives at 50 percent
power. Since it is assumed that the real exchange rates under PPP do not have a linear time
trend, we use 𝑐̅ =-7.
54
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We perform an augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the new generated variable by fitting the
OLS regression:
𝑝−1
∗
∗
∆𝑞𝑡∗ = 𝛼 ∗ + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑞𝑡−1
+ ∑ 𝜗𝑖∗ ∆𝑞𝑡−𝑖
+ 𝜖𝑡∗
𝑖=1
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APPENDIX B
DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE PERIODS FOR CHAPTER 1
Table B.1

Data sources and Sample periods

Data

Source

Sample Periods

130

IFS statistics (http://data.imf.org) for other countries than Chile

January, 1998 - November, 2017

OECD statistics (http://stats.oecd.org) for Chile

January, 1998 - November, 2017

IFS statistics (http://data.imf.org)

January, 1998 - November, 2017

Aggregate CPI

Aggregate PPI

IFS statistics (http://data.imf.org) except for Germany

January, 1998 - November,
2017

IFS statistics (http://data.imf.org) for Germany

January, 1999 - November,
2017

Average Nominal Exchange
Rate
against US dollar

Disaggregate CPI classified by COICOP
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Singapore

Department of Statistics Singapore
(http://www.singstat.gov.sg)

January, 1998 - November,
2017

Turkey

Turkish Statistical Institute (http://www.turkstat.gov.tr)

January, 2005 - November,
2017

U.S.

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (https://www.bls.gov/)

January, 1998 - November,
2017

Germany

Federal Statistical Office Germany (https://wwwgenesis.destatis.de)

January, 1999 - November,
2017

Norway

Statistics Norway (http://www.ssb.no)

January, 1998 - November,
2017
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APPENDIX C
TRADE VOLUMES WITH FTA PARTNERS
FOR CHAPTER 2
Tables C.1 - Table C.4 show trade volumes between South Korea and FTA partners before
and after the FTA. Also reported is the percentage change in trade volumes. Trade volumes
are (exports + imports) divided by nominal GDP, and calculate their average for each
period. Data are from www.customs.go.kr.
Table C.1

Trade Volumes: FTAs by country

Country

Full periods

Before FTA

After FTA

% Change

Chile

0.44

0.26

0.53

107.73

Singapore

1.82

1.41

2.12

49.87

India

1.00

0.77

1.39

80.73
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Peru

0.14

0.10

0.22

128.58

U.S.

8.83

9.09

8.09

-11.03

Turkey

0.35

0.31

0.49

57.42

Australia

1.89

1.90

1.79

-5.65

Canada

0.74

0.76

0.62

-17.56

14.98
China

12.29

12.14

23.39
(just for one year)

0.17
New Zealand

0.19

0.19

-10.77
(just for one year)

3.20
Vietnam

1.12

1.00

218.43
(just for one year)

Colombia

0.10

0.10

N/A

N/A

Note: FTAs with China, New Zealand, and Vietnam are in effect in December, 2015
and FTAs with Colombia are in effect in 2016, July.
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Table C.2

Trade Volumes: South Korea and EFTA FTA partners

Country

Full periods

Before FTA

After FTA

% Change

Iceland

0.007

0.006

0.007

16.67

Liechtenstein

0.0008

0.0004

0.0010

150.00

Norway

0.30

0.17

0.41

141.18

Switzerland

0.34

0.44

0.24

-45.45
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Table C.3

Trade Volumes: South Korea and ASEAN FTA partners

Country

Full periods

Before FTA

After FTA

% Change

Brunei

0.11

0.09

0.13

44.44

Cambodia

0.03

0.02

0.05

150.00

Indonesia

1.59

1.37

1.79

30.66

Laos

0.007

0.002

0.01

400.00

Malaysia

1.33

1.32

1.35

2.27

Myanmar

0.06

0.04

0.08

100.00

Philippines

0.81

0.78

0.84

7.69

Singapore

1.82

1.43

2.18

52.45

Thailand

0.81

0.66

0.94

42.42

Vietnam

1.12

0.43

1.74

304.65
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Table C.4

Trade Volumes: South Korea and EU FTA partners

Country

Full periods

Before FTA

After FTA

% Change

Austria

0.14

0.14

0.15

7.14

Belgium

0.31

0.32

0.28

-12.50

Bulgaria

0.018

0.018

0.020

11.11

Cyprus

0.09

0.10

0.06

-83.33

Croatia

0.012

0.011

0.015

36.36

Czech Republic

0.11

0.07

0.18

157.14

Denmark

0.13

0.12

0.15

25.00

Estonia

0.01

0.01

0.02

100.00

France

0.69

0.71

0.65

-9.72

Finland

0.18

0.20

0.12

-40.00
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Germany

2.03

2.04

1.99

-2.51

Greece

0.20

0.22

0.14

-36.36

Hungary

0.13

0.13

0.14

7.69

Italy

0.70

0.71

0.66

-7.04

Ireland

0.16

0.18

0.10

-44.44

Lithuania

0.01

0.01

0.02

100.00

Latvia

0.009

0.008

0.012

50.00

Luxembourg

0.01

0.01

0.02

100.00

Malta

0.11

0.10

0.14

40.00

Netherlands

0.70

0.71

0.67

-5.63

Poland

0.26

0.24

0.30

25.00

Portugal

0.06

0.06

0.04

-33.33
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Romania

0.06

0.06

0.09

50.00

Slovenia

0.06

0.04

0.12

200.00

Sweden

0.19

0.19

0.18

-5.26

Slovakia

0.19

0.15

0.31

106.67

Spain

0.34

0.36

0.30

-16.67

United Kingdom

1.01

1.06

0.90

-15.09
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